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Social Connections and Incentives in the Workplace: 
Evidence from Personnel Data
*
 
We present evidence on the effect of social connections between workers and managers on 
productivity in the workplace. To evaluate whether the existence of social connections is 
beneficial to the firm’s overall performance, we explore how the effects of social connections 
vary with the strength of managerial incentives and worker’s ability. To do so, we combine 
panel data on individual worker’s productivity from personnel records with a natural field 
experiment in which we engineered an exogenous change in managerial incentives, from 
fixed wages, to bonuses based on the average productivity of the workers managed. We find 
that when managers are paid fixed wages, they favor workers to whom they are socially 
connected irrespective of the worker’s ability, but when they are paid performance bonuses, 
they target their effort towards high ability workers irrespective of whether they are socially 
connected to them or not. Although social connections increase the performance of 
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This paper explores the eﬀects of social relationships between individuals within a ﬁrm, on the
productivity of individuals, and the ﬁrm’s overall performance. The idea that human relations
aﬀect behavior in the workplace has been long discussed in the sociology literature (Mayo 1933,
Barnard 1938, Roethlisberger and Dickson 1939, and Roy 1952). Economists have joined this
debate relatively recently, due both to the burgeoning theoretical literature on how social relations
and social preferences matter for economic behavior in general, and the increasing availability of
personnel data in particular.
In the context of ﬁrms, much of the literature — theoretical and empirical — has studied the
eﬀect of social relations within a single tier of the ﬁrm hierarchy, such as among managers, or
among workers.1 However it is reasonable to expect that such social connections might also span
across layers of the hierarchy, in particular between managers and their subordinates, and this is
likely to have important consequences for individual and ﬁrm performance, the optimal design of
compensation schemes, and the structure of organizations (Prendergast and Topel 1996).2
In general, social connections between managers and workers can help or harm ﬁrm perfor-
mance. On the one hand, social connections may be beneﬁcial to ﬁrm performance if they allow
managers to provide non-monetary incentives to workers, or help reduce informational asymme-
tries within the ﬁrm. On the other hand, managers may display favoritism towards workers they
are socially connected with, and this might be detrimental to the ﬁrm’s overall performance.3
In this paper, we present evidence on whether the existence of social connections between
workers and managers aﬀect the performance of connected workers and that of the ﬁrm as a
whole. The ﬁrm we study is a leading producer of soft fruit in the United Kingdom. We focus on
the behavior of individuals at two tiers of the ﬁrm hierarchy — workers and managers. The main
task of the workers is to pick fruit, whereas managers are responsible for logistics. Two key features
of this setting are that workers are paid piece rates and that managerial eﬀort is complementary
to worker eﬀort and can be targeted to individual workers. Taken together, these features imply
managers can signiﬁcantly inﬂuence a worker’s productivity and hence his earnings.
Managers and workers are all hired for one fruit picking season. They are university students
from eight Eastern European countries and are thus of similar ages and backgrounds. In addition,
they live on the farm site for the entire duration of their stay. Both features increase the likelihood
1Lazear (1989), Kandel and Lazear (1992), and Rotemberg (1994) develop models incorporating social concerns
into the analysis of behavior within ﬁrms. While they emphasize that individuals have social concerns for others at
the same tier of the ﬁrm hierarchy, their analysis is equally applicable across tiers of the hierarchy. Bewley (1999)
oﬀers extensive evidence from interviews with managers arguing that concerns over fair outcomes for workers and
the morale of employees are important determinants of their behavior.
2A related theoretical literature emphasizes the ineﬃciencies that arise from collusion between managers and
workers (Tirole 1986, Kofman and Lawarrée 1993), inﬂuence activities, and other forms of rent seeking behavior
by workers (Milgrom 1988, Milgrom and Roberts 1990).
3Both the positive and negative eﬀects of social connections have been stressed in the organizational behavior
and sociology literatures. Examples of such work includes that on the eﬀect of manager-subordinate similarity on
subjective outcomes such as performance evaluations and job satisfaction (Tsui and O’Reilly 1989, Thomas 1990,
Wesolowski and Mossholder 1997), and on how social networks within the ﬁrm inﬂuence within ﬁrm promotions
(Podolny and Baron 1997).
2of managers and workers forming strong social connections with each other.
To measure social connections we exploit three sources of similarity between managers and
workers — whether they are of the same nationality, whether they live in close proximity to each
other on the farm, and whether they arrived at a similar time on the farm. Our underlying
assumption is that individuals are more likely to befriend others if they are of the same nationality,
if they are neighbors, or if they share early experiences in a new workplace.
To identify the eﬀect of social connections we exploit two sources of variation. First, the
organization of the workplace is such that the allocation of workers to managers changes on a daily
basis. We exploit this variation to identify the eﬀect of social connections from the comparison of
the performance of a given worker on days when he is socially connected to his manager, to days
when he is not. Exploiting the within worker variation allows us to separate the eﬀect of social
connections from the eﬀect of unobservable individual traits, such as ability, that make workers
more likely to befriend managers and to have higher performance regardless of their connections.
Similarly, as we observe the same manager managing both workers she is socially connected
to and workers she is not connected to, we are also able to control for time invariant sources
of unobserved manager heterogeneity that aﬀect the productivity of connected and unconnected
workers alike, such as their management style or motivational skills.4
Second, we designed and implemented a ﬁeld experiment to exogenously vary the strength of
managerial incentives. In the experiment we changed the managerial compensation scheme from
ﬁxed wages to the same level of ﬁxed wages plus a performance bonus that is increasing in the
average productivity of the workers on the ﬁeld that day. Workers were paid according to the
same compensation scheme — piece rates — throughout.
The experiment allows us to identify whether and how the eﬀect of social connections between
the same managers and workers changes once managers are given performance pay and thus
provides an ideal counterfactual to assess the eﬀect of social connections on the overall ﬁrm’s
performance. To be precise, if the managers’ behavior towards connected workers changes once
their interests are more closely aligned with the ﬁrm’s, their previous behavior under ﬁxed wages
could have not been maximizing the ﬁrm’s average productivity. We provide further evidence on
this issue by quantifying the net eﬀect of social connections on the ﬁrm’s overall performance.
Our main ﬁndings are as follows. First, when managers are paid ﬁxed wages, the productivity
of a given worker is 9% higher when he is socially connected to his manager, relative to when he
is not, all else equal. As workers are paid piece rates, this translates into the same proportionate
change in earnings. Second, when managers are paid performance bonuses that tie their pay to
the average productivity of workers they manage, being socially connected to the manager has no
eﬀect on workers’ productivity.
Third, the introduction of managerial performance pay signiﬁcantly decreases the productivity
of low ability workers when they are connected to their manager relative to when they were
connected to their manager and she was paid a ﬁxed wage. The introduction of managerial
4Our empirical strategy is informed by the evidence that individual ‘styles’ of managers aﬀect ﬁrm performance
over and above ﬁrm level characteristics themselves (Bertrand and Schoar 2003, Malmendier and Tate 2005).
3performance pay increases the productivity of high ability workers, especially when they are not
connected to their managers. These ﬁndings indicate that when managers face low powered
incentives, they favor the workers they are socially connected to, regardless of the workers’ ability.
In contrast, when they face high powered incentives, managers favor high ability workers regardless
of the workers’ connection status.
Fourth, an increase in the level of social connections between managers and workers has a
detrimental eﬀect on the ﬁrms’ average productivity when managers are paid ﬁxed wages and
has no eﬀect when managers are paid performance bonuses. In this setting, social connections
are therefore detrimental for the ﬁrm because their existence distorts the allocation of managerial
eﬀort in favor of lower ability workers.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the ﬁrst to provide quantitative evidence on the
productivity eﬀect of social connections across tiers of the ﬁrm hierarchy. The paper builds on
our earlier ﬁndings on the eﬀects of the introduction of high powered managerial incentives in the
same setting (Bandiera et al 2007). The earlier paper focuses on the allocation of managerial eﬀort
under performance pay, irrespective of the social connections within the ﬁrm. The current paper
provides novel evidence on the importance of social connections in a ﬁrm setting, a previously
unexplored determinant of managers’ behavior.
The paper contributes to the growing empirical evidence on the interplay between social net-
works and individual and ﬁrm performance. This literature has explored how the response of
workers to incentives depends on their social connections with their co-workers at the same tier of
the ﬁrm hierarchy (Bandiera et al 2005), and how the demographic diﬀerences between managers
and their subordinates aﬀect the subordinates’ rate of quits, dismissals and promotions (Giuliano
et al 2005).5,6 Our paper also relates to the literature on employee and employer discrimination
(Becker 1957), and in particular to the ﬁndings of Black and Strahan (2001) who exploit a dereg-
ulation in product markets to show that, when competition is low, ﬁrms favor male over female
employees, both in terms of wages and promotion prospects.
Finally, it is important to stress from the outset that as in all the studies using detailed data
from one particular ﬁrm, precision comes at the cost of generality. In the last section we highlight
the key characteristics of this workplace and discuss the external validity of our ﬁndings.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our context and experimental research
design. Section 3 develops a theoretical framework to highlight the central forces at play when so-
cial connections can have potentially positive and negative eﬀects on worker productivity. Section
5Another branch of this literature has explored the eﬀects of the CEO or managerial board of ﬁrms being socially
connected to those outside of the ﬁrm such as local politicians and bureaucrats (Bertrand et al 2005, Kramarz and
Thesmar 2005, Mian and Khwaja 2005). In non ﬁrm settings, Garicano et al (2005) present evidence from soccer
matches on how referees favor home teams in order to satisfy the crowds in the stadium. Laband and Piette (1994)
show that journal editors use professional contacts to identify high impact papers. In that context favoritism thus
reduces informational asymmetries and is eﬃciency enhancing in the market for scientiﬁc knowledge.
6Fehr and Fischbacher (2002) provide an overview of the laboratory evidence on social preferences in workplace
environments. One branch of this stems from Akerlof (1982) and Akerlof and Yellen (1988) who view the labor
relation as a partial gift exchange. A separate branch of this experimental literature presents evidence that workers
care about their pay relative to other workers (Charness and Kuhn 2005).
44 describes the data and the identiﬁcation strategy. Section 5 presents the main results on the
eﬀect of social connections on worker productivity under each managerial incentive scheme. Sec-
tion 6 then explores whether there are heterogeneous eﬀects of social connections across workers
of diﬀerent ability to derive implications for the ﬁrm’s overall productivity. Section 7 concludes.
Proofs and further robustness checks are in the Appendix.
2 The Context and Experimental Design
2.1 Context
We analyze the behavior of managers and workers in the fruit picking division of a leading UK
producer of soft fruit during the 2003 season. Workers and managers are hired from eight countries
in Eastern Europe on seasonal contracts that last between three and six months.7 To be recruited,
individuals must be full-time university students, and have at least one year remaining before
graduation. Two features of the work environment increase the likelihood of individuals forming
strong social connections to each other — (i) workers and managers are of similar ages and have
similar socioeconomic backgrounds; (ii) they live and work on the farm site for the entire duration
of their stay, which on average is 100 days.
The workers’ primary task is to pick fruit. They typically pick on two or three diﬀerent ﬁelds
each day. At the start of a ﬁeld-day the manager allocates each worker to a row of fruit to be
picked. Once a worker clears this row, the manager is responsible for reallocating the worker to
another row within the ﬁeld. This process continues until all fruit within the ﬁeld is picked. As
each worker picks on his own row, his productivity is independent of the eﬀorts of other workers
on the same ﬁeld-day, so that there are no complementarities between workers arising from the
production technology. Workers do not choose how many hours to work — all workers are present
on the ﬁeld-day for the number of hours it takes to pick all the available fruit. Once a ﬁeld is
picked, workers and managers move on to other ﬁelds. As explained below, the match of workers
to managers can change across ﬁelds on the same day. The only choice variable of workers is how
much eﬀort to exert into picking.8
Workers are paid a piece rate per kilogram of fruit picked. Each worker’s pay is thus related
to his productivity, which is an increasing function of his eﬀort, the quantity of fruit available on
the rows he is assigned, and of the managerial eﬀort targeted towards him.
Managers are each assigned a group of around twenty workers, and their task is to monitor the
quality of fruit picking and to organize the ﬁeld logistics for this group. Managers on the same
ﬁeld focus on their assigned group of workers and work independently of each other. Managers
7Their work permit allows them to work on other UK farms subject to the approval of the permit agency. Their
outside option to employment at the farm is therefore to return home or to move to another farm during the season.
Few workers are hired for consecutive seasons and workers are not typically hired from the local labor market.
8Work is oﬀered on a casual basis with no daily guarantee of employment. In practice, managers manage each
day, and workers are engaged in picking tasks every other day. On other days workers are asked to perform non-
picking tasks such as planting or weeding, or may be left unemployed for the day. Over the season, individuals are
not observed moving across tiers of the hierarchy from picking tasks to managerial tasks or vice versa.
5control quality on three dimensions — that all ripe fruit is picked, that fruit is not damaged, and
that fruit is correctly classiﬁed by size. Field logistics include the allocation of workers to rows
and organizing the movement of fruit from the ﬁeld to the packaging plant.9
The key choice variables of each manager are the allocation of workers to rows, and the allo-
cation of eﬀort among her workers. Managers are responsible for allocating workers to rows at
the start of the ﬁeld-day, and for reallocating workers to new rows once they have ﬁnished picking
the row they were originally assigned to. How the manager matches workers to rows is important
because there is considerable variation in the quantity of fruit across rows within a ﬁeld. Some of
this is due to the natural variation in fruit quantity on diﬀerent plants. This variation also stems
from some rows being closer to pillars that support the plastic covering over the ﬁeld. Rows close
to pillars are harder to pick, air circulation is worse, and hence heat tends to accumulate. These
factors reduce the marginal productivity of worker’s eﬀort in these rows, other things equal.
The manager chooses how to allocate her eﬀort across workers along two dimensions. First,
if several workers ﬁnish picking their rows at the same time the manager has to decide whom
to reallocate to a new row ﬁrst. Second, workers place the fruit they have picked into crates.
Once these are full, managers have to ensure that new empty crates are provided to workers and
that full crates are removed from the ﬁeld and shipped to the packaging plant. If several workers
simultaneously ﬁll their crates, the manager chooses whom to help ﬁrst. In this environment,
managerial eﬀort is therefore complementary to worker’s eﬀort.
The eﬀort costs to the manager are considerable because the workers she is responsible for are
dispersed over a large area. The median ﬁeld size is such that each manager has to cover an area
of around one hectare. To ensure she is aware of which workers need to be reallocated to new rows
and which need their crates replaced, managers need to continuously walk around the ﬁeld.10
Social connections between managers and workers can have two eﬀects. First, if a manager
is concerned about the pay of the workers she is socially connected to, she can allocate more
of her eﬀort towards them thus increasing their productivity and their earnings. The eﬀect of
managerial eﬀort on worker productivity can be substantial. Assuming that workers pick at a
constant speed, if the manager slacks for ﬁve minutes every hour and a worker is left to wait for a
new crate for the same time, his productivity would be 5/60=8% lower. Second, a manager might
be better informed about the ability or skills of workers she is socially connected to, or be able
to exert stronger social pressure on them to work hard, both of which generate a diﬀerence in the
allocation of managerial eﬀort between connected and unconnected workers.11
We now discuss the two features of this work environment that allow us to assess whether
9A separate group of individuals, called ﬁeld runners, are responsible for physically moving fruit from the ﬁeld
to the packaging plant. They do not themselves pick fruit nor do they manage workers.
10The disposition of plants in the ﬁeld is such that it is not practical for workers to retain a stock of empty crates.
11In principle, a manager could boost connected workers’ productivity by letting them slack on quality — namely
by allowing connected workers to leave hard to reach fruits on the plants. In practice, however, this is unlikely to
be the case for two reasons. First, damaged or misclassiﬁed fruit is identiﬁed at the packing stage of the production
process. The monitoring system in place then allows senior management to attribute fruit quality to individual
managers. Second, a permanent employee of the farm checks that no ripe fruit is left on the plants at the end of
each day.
6social connections shape the managers’ eﬀort allocation choice and, as a consequence, workers’
earnings, and how this depends on the compensation scheme in place for managers.
2.2 Key Feature 1: Natural Variation
The production technology is such that the demand and supply of picking labor varies across ﬁeld-
days. On any given ﬁeld-day the demand for labor depends on the size of the ﬁeld, on the orders
received from supermarkets for the speciﬁc variety of fruit grown on that ﬁeld, and on the number
of plants that have reached maturity. This varies over time and declines during the life-cycle of
the ﬁeld. The supply of labor depends on the demand for picking labor on other ﬁelds, which
varies for the same reasons, and the demand for non-picking tasks such as planting and weeding.12
Due to this natural variation, the number of workers and managers varies within the same
ﬁeld across diﬀerent days, and across diﬀerent ﬁelds within the same day. Importantly for our
study, this also implies that the same worker can be supervised by diﬀerent managers on diﬀerent
ﬁeld-days. In particular, a worker can be supervised by a manager he is socially connected to on
some ﬁeld-days, and by another manager that he is not socially connected to on others.
Managers and workers are allocated to ﬁelds by a higher-tier permanent employee of the farm,
whom we refer to as the chief operating oﬃcer (COO).13
2.3 Key Feature 2: The Experimental Research Design
We designed and implemented a ﬁeld experiment in which we exogenously changed the compensa-
tion scheme of the managers and the COO. At the start of the 2003 season, the managers and the
COO were paid a ﬁxed wage. Midway through the 2003 season, we added a performance bonus
to the same level of ﬁxed wages. The experiment left the compensation scheme of the workers
unchanged — workers were paid piece rates throughout the 2003 season.14
The bonus payment was awarded on ﬁeld f and day t if the workers average productivity on the
ﬁeld-day, Y ft, exceeded an exogenously ﬁxed threshold, Y ∗. Conditional on reaching the threshold,
the total monetary value of the bonus payment available to the managers, B(Y ft) increases at an
increasing rate in the average ﬁeld-day productivity. The personnel software does not allow to
record the exact match between workers and managers within the ﬁeld-day, but it does record the
identity of all the managers and all the workers on the ﬁeld-day. Each manager then obtains an
equal share of the bonus payment generated on the ﬁeld-day. If there are Mft managers present,
12The fruit is planted some years in advance, so the quantity of fruit to be picked is given. The order in which
ﬁelds are picked is decided at the start of the season
13Section 4 makes precise the underlying assumptions that allow us to exploit this source of variation to identify
the eﬀects of social connections in the workplace. In the Appendix we present evidence in support of these identifying
assumptions.
14The change was announced to the COO and managers a week in advance of the actual change. During this
week, we spent time going through numerical examples with management to make sure they understood how the
performance bonus would be calculated. Workers were not informed of the change in managerial compensation,
but given that managers and workers live on the farm, they are likely to have understood the change over time.
7each obtains a payment of 1
MftB(Y ft).15
The daily bonus payment that accrues to the COO for any given ﬁeld is 1.5 times that which
accrues to a manager on the ﬁeld. Moreover, since the COO is responsible for every ﬁeld operated






The introduction of the bonus might aﬀect managers’ behavior through three channels — (i)
because they now have a stake in ﬁrm’s productivity; (ii) because the COO might exert more
pressure to maximize his bonus payments, and, (iii) because of increased competition for manage-
rial jobs. Indeed, given that the quantity of fruit to be picked is constant, if the introduction of
the bonus increases productivity, the demand for picking and managerial labor might fall as fewer
workers are needed to pick the same amount. All three channels lead managers to take actions
that increase the ﬁrm’s productivity.
Finally, to avoid multi-tasking concerns (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991), the performance
bonus was not awarded if the quality of fruit picking declined.16
The fraction of ﬁeld-days on which the bonus was earned varies from 20 to 50% across managers.
The ex post monetary value of the performance bonus to managers is substantial. Averaged across
all ﬁeld-days worked under the bonus, managerial hourly earnings increased by 7%. Conditional
on obtaining the bonus, managerial hourly earnings increased by 25%. The true expected hourly
earnings increase to managers of the performance bonus lies between these bounds.17,18
To identify whether managers allocate more eﬀort to workers they are socially connected to, we
compare the productivity of the same worker on ﬁeld-days in which he is socially connected to his
manager, to his productivity on ﬁeld-days in which he is not socially connected to his manager. We





0 if Y ∗ > Y ft
a1 + b1Y ft if Y ∗ + c1 > Y ft ≥ Y ∗
a2 + b2Y ft if Y ∗ + c2 > Y ft ≥ Y ∗ + c1
a3 + b3Y ft if Y ft > Y ∗ + c2
where ai, bi and ci are constants such that a3 < a2 < a1, b3 > b2 > b1, c2 > c1. This reﬂects the fact that the
marginal cost of supplying managerial eﬀort is increasing. The parameters ai, bi, and ci are set such that B(Y ft)
is a continuous and convex function. The values of ai, bi, ci, and Y ∗ cannot be provided due to conﬁdentiality.
Finally, we note that since the bonus payment is shared by all managers on a ﬁeld, free-riding might reduce the
strength of incentives. Three features of this context make free-riding unlikely — (i) there are between two and four
managers on most ﬁeld-days; (ii) managers can monitor each other on the ﬁeld; (iii) managers interact repeatedly
both on and oﬀ the ﬁeld.
16Quality is deﬁned along two dimensions — (i) the quantity of damaged fruit; (ii) fruit has to be classiﬁed as
either suitable for market or supermarket, largely based on the size of each fruit. If the percentage of damaged or
misclassiﬁed fruit rose by more than 2% from a pre-established norm, then the bonus was not awarded.
17Given that — (i) managers are from Eastern Europe; (ii) their base pay is 20% higher than the UK minimum
wage; (iii) most individuals save earnings to spend later in their home country, these increases in hourly earnings
translate into large increases in real income. As of January 2003, gross monthly earnings at the UK minimum wage
(∈1105) are 5 times as high as at the minimum wage in Poland (∈201), where 40% of managers come from, and
almost 20 times higher than in Bulgaria (∈56), where 30% of managers come from.
18The managers were unaware they were taking part in an experiment and that the data would be used for
scientiﬁc research. As such, our experiment is a natural ﬁeld experiment according to the taxonomy of Harrison
and List (2004). The managers were however aware that productivity data were recorded and kept by the farm
owner, and that the data would be analyzed to improve the ﬁrms’ overall eﬃciency.
8exploit the exogenous variation in managerial incentives our research design provides to identify
whether the eﬀects of social connections depend on the managerial incentive scheme in place. The
comparison allows us to establish whether social connections are beneﬁcial or detrimental to the
ﬁrm’s overall performance as explained in the next Section.
3 Theoretical Framework
We present a simple theoretical framework to illustrate the eﬀect of social connections on the
level and allocation of managerial eﬀort across workers, and on ﬁrm productivity. The framework
illustrates the existence of social connections weakly increases managerial eﬀort but also changes
the allocation of eﬀort in favor of workers the manager is socially connected to. The net eﬀect on
the ﬁrm’s aggregate productivity is ambiguous. The framework makes precise how we can sign
the allocation eﬀect by exploiting the exogenous change in the strength of managerial incentives.
3.1 Technology and Incentives
We assume production requires one manager and two workers in any given ﬁeld. Workers pick
fruit, and the manager organizes logistics for each worker. The manager chooses her level of eﬀort
and how to allocate it between the workers. To make matters concrete, the managerial eﬀort
directed towards a worker can be thought of as the eﬀort devoted to ensure he is allocated a new
row of fruit as soon as he is done picking the current one, or the eﬀort devoted to ensure he does
not have to wait for his crates to be replaced.
For simplicity and without loss of generality we do not model workers’ eﬀort choices. Also,
for simplicity we assume the manager’s eﬀort targeted towards worker i aﬀects worker i alone.
The output of worker i is then given by yi = θikimi, where θi measures his innate ability, mi
is the managerial eﬀort targeted towards him, and ki > 0 is a measure of the strength of the
complementarity between the manager’s and worker’s eﬀorts. We assume the two workers have
ability levels θ and 1, with θ > 1, and index them with subscripts h and l for high and low ability
respectively.19
Managerial eﬀort takes two values, high (m =   m > 1) and low (m = 1). The disutility of eﬀort
to the manager, C(m), equals 0 if eﬀort is low and c > 0 if eﬀort is high.20
The productivity of worker i, measured as the kilograms of fruit picked per hour. As all workers
in the ﬁeld work for the same time, we normalize hours to one so output and productivity coincide.
Total output is
 
i yi as there are no spillovers across workers or complementarities in production.
As in our empirical setting, we assume worker i’s pay, pW
i , equals his productivity, yi, to reﬂect
19The qualitative results are unchanged if we allow workers to also choose eﬀort. The qualitative results are also
unchanged if we allow mi to have a positive spillover eﬀect on the output of the non-targeted worker j, as long as
the direct eﬀect of mj on the productivity of worker j is suﬃciently stronger than the eﬀect of mi on j.
20The assumption reﬂects the fact that in our setting the manager’s cost of eﬀort depends on total eﬀort rather
than on the identity of the workers targeted. Namely the cost of moving around the ﬁeld to identify which crates
to replace and workers to reallocate does not depend on the ability of the worker that gets reallocated.
9the fact that workers are paid piece rates, and hence their earnings are a linear function of their
productivity. The manager’s compensation schedule is pM = f + bY , where f is a ﬁxed wage
and Y =
 
iyi is the aggregate output of her subordinates. The parameter b ≥ 0 captures the
strength of managerial incentives, namely the variable component of managerial pay which is
linearly related to aggregate worker productivity.
3.2 Social Connections
Social connections can aﬀect in reduced form both agents’ preferences and the production tech-
nology. To capture the ﬁrst channel we follow Prendergast and Topel (1996) in assuming the









where σi measures the social connection between the manager and worker i. We assume that
σi = σ > 0 if worker i is connected to the manager while σi = 0 if he is not. These preferences
can be seen to represent manager’s altruism towards their subordinates, but also as the reduced
form of a model in which the manager cares about the connected workers’ earnings because she
receives kickbacks from them.21
If social connections ameliorate the moral hazard problem between the manager and workers,
or if they help foster cooperation or improve communication between managers and workers, they
aﬀect workers’ productivity directly. To capture this second channel we assume the strength of
the complementarity between managerial and worker eﬀort depends on their social connections.
That is, given worker i’s productivity, yi = θikimi, we assume ki = k > 1 if worker i is connected
to the manager (σi = σ), while ki = 1 if he is not (σi = 0).
3.3 The Manager’s Eﬀort and Allocation Choices
The manager chooses (mh,ml), namely how much eﬀort to allocate to the high and low ability
worker, to maximize her utility, as given in (1). Substituting for the manager’s and workers’ pay,
the manager’s problem is,
max
mh,ml
(b + σh)θk(σh)mh + (b + σl)k(σl)ml − C(mh + ml) (2)
The two propositions below describe the eﬀect of social connections on managerial eﬀort, and
hence, on the ﬁrm’s productivity, respectively. All proofs are in the Appendix.
Proposition 1: Social connections weakly increase the level of managerial eﬀort and might
21We focus on whether managers and workers are socially connected or not, rather than on the strength of the
social connection. What matters for the analysis is that managers may be connected to a greater extent to some
workers than others. We also focus on the case in which σ ≥ 0. A negative weight could be interpreted as the
manger being spiteful towards the worker.
10alter the allocation of eﬀort in favor of the worker the manager is socially connected to.
The existence of social connections implies σi > 0 and k(σi) > 1. Thus social connections
raise the marginal beneﬁt of eﬀort both because the manager internalizes the eﬀect of her eﬀort
on the connected worker earnings and because the marginal eﬀect of managerial eﬀort on worker’s
productivity is higher when the manager and the worker are socially connected. Other things
equal, social connections therefore have an unambiguous eﬀect on the level of eﬀort, namely a
manager is more likely to choose m =   m, when she is socially connected to one or both workers.
This follows immediately from the fact that since both the production and the cost of eﬀort
functions are linear in (mh,ml), and there are no spillovers across workers, the manager’s utility
function (2) is linear in (mh,ml). This implies that, regardless of the level of eﬀort chosen, the
manager will target only the worker that yields the highest marginal beneﬁt.22
Social connections, however, aﬀect the allocation of managerial eﬀort. Indeed, the marginal
beneﬁt of targeting worker i is equal to (b + σi)k(σi), thus, other things equal the manager is
more likely to target worker i if σi > 0 and k(σi) > 0. Therefore, social connections also have
an allocation eﬀect on managerial eﬀort. In the Appendix we show that — (i) if the manager is
connected to the high ability worker, she always targets him; (ii) if the manager is connected to
the low ability worker, there exists a set of parameters for which she targets her eﬀort towards
him.
In this second case, social connections distort the allocation of managerial eﬀort towards low
ability workers and might therefore be detrimental to the ﬁrm overall. Whether social connections
are beneﬁcial or detrimental for the ﬁrm in this case depends on the sign and relative magnitude
of the level and allocation eﬀects as described in the following result.
Proposition 2: If the manager is connected to the high ability worker, social connections have
an unambiguously positive eﬀect on the ﬁrm’s productivity. If the manager is connected only to
the low ability worker, the eﬀect of social connections on the ﬁrm’s productivity is ambiguous. It
is more likely to be negative if the complementarity with the connected worker is low, or if the
diﬀerence in workers’ ability is large.
To summarize, the existence of social connections has both a level eﬀect and an allocation
eﬀect on managerial eﬀort. As the ﬁrm’s productivity is increasing in managerial eﬀort, and social
connections weakly increase eﬀort, the levels eﬀect of social connections is always weakly positive.
The sign of the allocation eﬀect is however ambiguous. If the manager is connected only to the
high ability worker, she targets him and the allocation eﬀect is positive. In the Appendix we
provide the precise conditions under which if the manager is connected only to the low ability
worker, she targets him and the allocation eﬀect is negative.23
22The manager chooses ¯ m if and only if {max[θkh (b + σh),kl (b + σl)]}(¯ m − 1) > c. The right hand side is
increasing in (σh,σl). In a model with continuous managerial eﬀort and convex costs, the eﬀect of social connections
on managerial eﬀort would be strictly positive.
23Note that since manager’s pay is increasing in productivity, social connections aﬀect the wage bill. Thus even
if social connections increase the ﬁrm’s productivity they might reduce ﬁrm’s proﬁts.
113.4 Testing for a Negative Allocation Eﬀect
The framework above makes precise that social connections can be detrimental for the ﬁrm only
if their existence distorts the allocation of managerial eﬀort in favor of low ability workers who
are connected to managers. We now show that an exogenous change in the strength of managerial
incentives b can be used to test whether the allocation eﬀect is negative. The test relies on two
sources of variation: the variation in the strength of managerial incentives and the variation in
social connections. The ﬁrst stems from the fact that the productivity of the same workers is
measured both when managerial incentives are low powered (ﬁxed wage) and when they are high
powered (bonus scheme). The second stems from the fact that the productivity of the same workers
is observed both on ﬁeld-days when they are socially connected to managers and on ﬁeld-days in
which they are not while their co-workers are.
An increase in b increases both the marginal beneﬁt of eﬀort and the relative weight the
manager places on productivity vis-à-vis the utility of the connected workers. Increasing b can
thus aﬀect both the level and the allocation of managerial eﬀort. Our empirical test is then based
on a revealed preference argument — if the manager changes her eﬀort allocation from the low
to the high ability worker when she has a larger stake in the ﬁrm’s productivity, namely when
the performance bonus is in place, the allocation of managerial eﬀort across workers under the
wage regime could have not been maximizing productivity. The test then consists of measuring
the eﬀect of social connections on connected workers of diﬀerent ability by managerial incentive
scheme, and testing whether the manager reallocates eﬀort from low to high ability workers as a
result of the increase in the strength of her incentives, b.
If the allocation eﬀect is indeed detrimental to productivity, the allocation of eﬀort should de-
pend on the managerial incentive scheme as follows. First, when the manager is paid a ﬁxed wage,
she should target connected workers regardless of their ability. Hence, the productivity of both
low and high ability workers should be higher when they are connected to their manager compared
to when they are not. Second, when the manager when the manager is paid performance bonuses,
she should target high ability workers regardless of their connections. Hence the introduction of
the bonus should — (i) strictly increase the productivity of high ability workers on ﬁeld-days in
which they are not connected, and, (ii) strictly decrease the productivity of the low ability workers
on ﬁeld-days in which they are connected.
Finding evidence consistent with these predictions would provide support for the hypothesis
that social connections have a negative allocation eﬀect on productivity against the joint alterna-
tive hypotheses that the allocation eﬀect is non-negative or that the increase in b is not suﬃciently
large to change managerial behavior. Finally, we present evidence on the net eﬀect of social con-
nections on productivity by incentive scheme. This allows us to gauge whether any beneﬁcial
levels eﬀect of social connections on managerial eﬀort more than oﬀset the distortionary eﬀects
they have on the allocation of managerial eﬀort.
124 Data and Descriptives
4.1 Data Sources
Our primary data source is the ﬁrm’s personnel records. These contain three types of information.
First, they list each worker’s productivity on every ﬁeld-day they pick fruit. Productivity is deﬁned
as the kilograms of fruit picked per hour, and is electronically recorded with little measurement
error. Second, while they do not contain information on the exact worker-manager match, the
data identiﬁes all the workers and managers present on each ﬁeld-day. On most ﬁeld-days there
are between 40 and 80 workers, and between 2 and 4 managers, so we are able to build a measure
of the probability that a given worker-manager pair is matched. Finally, the personnel records
contain information on each individual’s nationality, date of arrival, and accommodation location
on the farm, which we use to measure social connections as described below.
Throughout, we analyze data on the main fruit type, focus on the main farm site during the
peak picking season from May 1st until August 31st 2003. As part of our experimental design,
the change in managerial incentives occurred midway through the peak season — June 27th — so
there are 43 days in the pre-bonus period and 51 days post-bonus. To ensure that changes in ﬁeld
composition do not drive the results, we focus on ﬁelds that were picked at least one week either
side of the change in managerial incentives. Note that a given ﬁeld is not picked on every day, and
more than one ﬁeld is picked on any given day. To ensure our estimates are not contaminated by
changes in the composition of the workforce over the season, we restrict the sample to individuals
that work at least one week either side of the change in managerial incentives. The ﬁnal sample
then contains 10148 worker-ﬁeld-day productivity observations from 241 ﬁeld-days. This covers
144 workers, 10 managers, 13 ﬁelds, and 94 days.24
4.2 Measuring Social Connections
We measure social connections between managers and workers along three dimensions — nationality,
time of arrival on the farm, and the location on the farm where individuals reside during the season.
The ﬁrst measure deﬁnes a worker and manager to be connected if they are of the same
nationality, based on the assumption that people are more likely to befriend others who come
from the same country and share the same mother tongue. As individuals are hired from eight
Eastern European countries, we observe considerable variation along this dimension.25
The second measure of social connections is based on the time that individuals arrive on the
farm. This varies across individuals for reasons that are exogenous to the worker’s performance,
such as their university term dates in their home countries and the date on which their work permit
is issued. On arrival, individuals are consecutively assigned a worker number and then attend an
induction programme with others that have arrived at a similar time. Hence the ﬁrst group of
24Fields are located on two sites on the farm, of which we only use the largest for the analysis as fruit in the
smaller site began to ripen only after the introduction of the managerial performance bonus scheme.
25Among workers, the most common nationalities are Polish (35%), followed by Ukrainian (29%) and Bulgarian
(10%). Among managers, 40% are Polish, 30% are Bulgarian, and the others are Lithuanian.
13people that each individual is exposed to, and may form social ties with, are those that arrive on
a similar date. If two individuals have a worker number within the same ten digit window, we
deﬁne the two to be socially connected through their arrival cohort.
The third measure of social connections is based on the geographic location where individuals
live during their stay on the farm. Each worker lives in a caravan with up to ﬁve others, and
each caravan is assigned a unique number. On the main farm site caravans are arranged around a
communal space and numbered consecutively from 1 to 46. We deﬁne two individuals to be socially
connected through their living site if they live within ﬁve caravan numbers of each other. The
underlying assumption is that individuals are more likely to form social ties with their neighbors.26
While we do not have direct information on the social relations between managers and workers,
we can provide evidence that the three measures of similarity — nationality, arrival cohort, and
neighborhood — are predictors of friendship in this setting. In 2004, that is one year after the
season we analyze here, we administered a worker survey to workers in the same farm to collect
information about friendship links. Using those data, in Bandiera et al (2008) we ﬁnd that the
odds of a worker j to be named as a friend by another worker i if they are of the same nationality is
14.7 times larger than the odds of worker j being named by i if they are of diﬀerent nationalities.
The corresponding ﬁgures for arrival cohort and geographical neighborhood are 14.3 and 9.7.
These odds are all signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one, and the results are robust to conditioning on a
host of other controls for the similarity in observables between workers.
Based on these three criteria of similarity, most workers are connected to at least one manager
along at least one dimension. Of the 10148 worker-ﬁeld-day observations in our sample, 8884
correspond to workers that are socially connected to managers. We therefore identify the causal
eﬀect of social connections on worker performance from the observed within worker variation in
productivity. In other words, instead of comparing the productivity of workers who are connected
to the productivity of workers who are not, we identify the eﬀect of social connections by comparing
the productivity of the same worker on ﬁeld-days in which he is connected to his manager, to his
productivity on ﬁeld-days in which he is not connected. Since workers who are never connected to
any manager do not contribute to these estimates, we restrict the sample to the 8884 worker-ﬁeld-
day observations of workers who are socially connected to at least one manager on the farm.27
To measure whether a worker is connected to his manager on any given ﬁeld-day we ﬁrst deﬁne
cij = 1 if worker i and manager j are connected along any dimension, and 0 otherwise. Second,
we note that while each worker is assigned to only one manager, we do not know the exact match
of workers to managers within the ﬁeld. On most ﬁeld-days there are between 2 and 4 managers
and between 40 and 80 workers present. Given Mft managers present on the ﬁeld-day, we can
compute the probability that worker i is connected to his manager as the share of managers worker
i is connected to on the ﬁeld-day, Cift =
 
j cij
Mft ,where the summation in the numerator is over all
26There are no opportunities for workers to themselves choose their caravan or worker numbers.
27Unconnected workers are however not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from connected workers on observables such as
age, gender, and previous work experience.
14managers j on ﬁeld-day ft.28
4.3 Descriptives
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for our variable of interest Cift, the share of managers on
ﬁeld-day ft that are socially connected to worker i. The ﬁrst row shows that, on average, the
share is .425 when managers are paid ﬁxed wages and .412 when managers are paid performance
bonuses. The fact that the shares are almost identical under the two compensation schemes
suggests that the process by which managers and workers are allocated to ﬁelds is orthogonal to
the compensation scheme in place.
The empirical analysis exploits the variation in social connections within a worker over time.
Table 1 shows that, reassuringly, at least one third of the overall variation in social connections
arises from variation within a worker over ﬁeld-days. This is true under both managerial incentive
schemes, and along each dimension that deﬁnes social connections.29
Throughout we analyze the eﬀect of social connections on worker productivity because, in our
setting, productivity can be directly aﬀected by managers’ behavior and it determines workers’
earnings given that they are paid piece rates. Table 2 presents descriptive evidence on productivity
by connection status, managerial incentive scheme, and workers’ ability. For ease of exposition
we employ a discrete measure of social connections, DCift, which is equal to 1 if worker i is
connected to at least one manager on ﬁeld-day ft, and 0 otherwise. To analyze whether the eﬀect
of connections diﬀer by workers’ ability we rank workers according their average productivity when
managers are paid bonuses and use the median to split them into two ability groups.30
Panel A of Table 2 pools all workers and illustrates that when managers are paid ﬁxed wages,
worker productivity is 7.21kg/hr when workers are unconnected and rises signiﬁcantly to 8.98kg/hr
when workers are managed by individuals they are socially connected to. In contrast, when man-
agers are paid bonuses, the average worker’s productivity is no diﬀerent on ﬁeld-days when he is
socially connected to ﬁeld-days when he is socially unconnected. The unconditional diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerence in workers’ productivity by their social connections to managers and across managerial
incentive scheme, is 1.59kg/hr, and is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. As workers are paid piece
rates, diﬀerences in worker productivity by social connectivity to managers and managerial incen-
tive scheme translate into similar diﬀerences in worker earnings. This is quantitatively important
both in percentage terms and in absolute terms when aggregated over the season.31
28The median number of managers and workers is 3 and 59, respectively. Field-days with less than 4 managers
account for 83% of the sample.
29For the variance decomposition to sum to the total variance in an unbalanced panel, it is necessary to weight
the between component by the number of workers on the ﬁeld-day.
30The theoretical framework makes clear that the probability of social connections aﬀecting the managers’ allo-
cation decision is decreasing in the strength of managerial incentives. Thus if social connections aﬀect productivity
only when managers are paid ﬁxed wages, the productivity under the bonus better reﬂects a worker’s true ability.
It is important to note that there is little churning of workers in this ranking — the rank correlation between workers
average productivity when managers are paid wages and when managers are paid bonuses is .69.
31The average worker picks on two to three ﬁelds per day and stays on the farm for 100 days. A back of the
envelope calculation suggests that over the course of a season, a worker would earn £500 more if managers were
15As highlighted by the theoretical framework in Section 3, the evidence in Panel A is consistent
with two interpretations of managers’ behavior following the introduction of the bonus — either
managers exert more eﬀort and target all workers regardless of their connection status, or man-
agers exert more eﬀort and reallocate it from connected workers towards high ability workers to
maximize average productivity. To distinguish between these interpretations, Panels B and C pro-
vide evidence on the eﬀect of social connections on workers who are below and above the median
level of ability, respectively. Three points are of note.
First, when managers are paid ﬁxed wages, the ﬁrst Column in Panels B and C shows that
social connections increase worker productivity for both groups, suggesting that managers target
connected workers regardless of their ability level.
Second, Panel B shows that the introduction of the bonus does not aﬀect the productivity of
low ability workers in days in which they are not connected, while it reduces their productivity
by around 8% on connected ﬁeld-days. This is consistent with the view that managers target low
ability connected workers when paid ﬁxed wages, but stop engaging in such behavior when paid
bonuses. Consequently, the productivity of low ability workers when managed by those they are
connected to, signiﬁcantly falls as managers interests become more aligned with those of the ﬁrm.
Third, Panel C shows the introduction of managerial performance bonuses increases the pro-
ductivity of high ability workers both on ﬁeld-days in which they are unconnected and on ﬁeld-days
in which they are connected. The eﬀect on unconnected ﬁeld-days is more than twice as large as
the eﬀect on connected ﬁeld-days, and the diﬀerence in diﬀerence is positive and precisely esti-
mated. This indicates that the introduction of the bonus increases the productivity of high ability
workers because managers’ eﬀort is both higher, and more likely to be targeted towards them.
Overall, the evidence in Table 2 indicates that managers target connected workers irrespective
of their ability when paid ﬁxed wages, whereas they reallocate their eﬀort in favor of high ability
workers when paid performance bonuses irrespective of whether they are socially connected to
them or not. This suggests that social connections distort the allocation of managerial eﬀort
across workers, and that this eﬀect is detrimental to the ﬁrm’s productivity as managers stop
targeting connected workers when their interests become more closely aligned with the ﬁrms’.
In the remainder of the paper, we present formal evidence to shed light on whether these
descriptive results are robust to controlling for other determinants of productivity. In doing so, we
make precise the underlying identifying assumptions required to interpret this evidence as causal,
and present evidence in support of these identifying assumptions.
always paid a ﬁxed wage, and workers were always managed by individuals they are socially connected to. Given
that workers in our sample live in Eastern Europe and much of their earnings are saved to spend in their home
country, the real value of these diﬀerences is substantial.
165 Social Connections and Worker Productivity
5.1 Methodology
The empirical analysis proceeds in two stages. First, we estimate the eﬀect of social connections on
the average worker by managerial incentive scheme. Next, we allow the eﬀect of social connections
and managerial incentives to diﬀer across workers. To identify whether social connections aﬀect
worker’s productivity, and how this depends on the managerial compensation scheme in place, we
estimate the following panel data regression,
yift =















 sSsft + δXift + ηZft + ϕt + uift,
(3)
where yift is worker i’s log productivity on ﬁeld f and day t. The worker ﬁxed eﬀects αi account
for permanent productivity diﬀerences across workers, such as those arising from innate ability or
motivation, and the ﬁeld ﬁxed eﬀects λf capture permanent productivity diﬀerences across ﬁelds,
such as those arising from soil quality.32
Cift is the log of the share of managers worker i is socially connected to on the ﬁeld-day. Bt is a
dummy variable equal to 1 after the performance bonus is introduced (June 27th), and 0 otherwise.
The parameters of interest throughout are γ0, which measures the eﬀect of social connections when
managers are paid a ﬁxed wage, and γ1 , which measures the eﬀect of social connections when
managers are paid performance bonuses. The null hypothesis is that social connections do not
aﬀect productivity, so γ0 = γ1 = 0.
Since connectivity is deﬁned along the lines of nationality, living site, and arrival cohort, γ0
and γ1 might be biased if, for example, the introduction of the bonus has diﬀerent eﬀects on
workers of diﬀerent nationalities. This is because the connection measure Cift would then also
be picking up any diﬀerential eﬀect of the performance bonus by worker nationality. Obviously,
similar concerns arise if workers are diﬀerentially aﬀected on the basis of their living site or time
of arrival on the farm once managerial performance bonuses are introduced. To address these
concerns we control for a set of interactions between the performance bonus dummy Bt and the
complete set of nationality, arrival cohort and living site dummies.
To do so we deﬁne a dummy variable Dk
id = 1 if worker i is of type-d along dimension k, and
0 otherwise, and Nk denotes the total number of types along dimension k. For example, when
k is nationality, Dk
id = 1 when the worker is of nationality d, and Nk is equal to eight as this
is the number of diﬀerent nationalities in our data. These interactions ﬂexibly control for any
heterogenous eﬀect on workers of the change in managerial incentives along these dimensions.
Hence we estimate the eﬀect of the within worker variation in social connectivity conditional on
32If this speciﬁcation is estimated only with worker ﬁxed eﬀects, they explain 25% of the variation in worker
productivity, suggesting there is considerable heterogeneity across workers. Estimating the speciﬁcation conditional
on only ﬁeld ﬁxed eﬀects explains 11% of the overall variation. Estimating the speciﬁcation conditional only on
manager ﬁxed eﬀects explains 3.5% of the overall variation.
17any heterogeneous eﬀects between workers that may arise as managers respond to the introduction
of performance bonuses along other margins apart from those arising from social connections with
their subordinates.
Ssft is a dummy equal to 1 if manager s works on ﬁeld f on day t, and 0 otherwise, and Mft is
the set of managers that work on the ﬁeld-day. Hence
 
s∈Mft
 sSsft in (3) corresponds to a full set
of manager dummies. These control for time invariant traits of each manager, such as their ability
to motivate workers and their management style, that aﬀect the performance of managed workers.
These allow us to address the concern that there are unobservable managers’ characteristics that
drive both their social connections and the performance of their subordinates.
Xift is the worker’s picking experience, deﬁned as the cumulative number of ﬁeld-days they
have picked fruit on the farm. Zft captures time-varying ﬁeld characteristics. This includes the
ﬁeld’s life cycle, deﬁned as the nth day the ﬁeld is picked divided by the total number of days
the ﬁeld is picked over the season. This captures the natural within-ﬁeld trend in productivity as
ﬁelds deplete over time. We also include a time trend t to capture learning by farm management
and any aggregate trends in productivity.33
We also note that the social connections between a worker and his managers are unlikely to
be identically and independently distributed within a worker over ﬁeld-days. We therefore adopt
a conservative strategy in estimating standard errors and allow the disturbance terms uift to be
clustered by worker throughout.34
The parameters of interest (γ0,γ1) identify the causal eﬀect of social connections on worker
productivity under each managerial incentive scheme by comparing the productivity of a given
worker on ﬁeld-days when he is socially connected to his manager to his productivity on ﬁeld-days
when he is unconnected. The validity of the identiﬁcation strategy and the causal interpretation
given to the results relies on two key assumptions. The ﬁrst is that unobserved determinants of
workers’ allocation to managers are orthogonal to the managerial incentive scheme in place. The
second is that any eﬀect of social connections on individual productivity that is unrelated to the
managerial incentive scheme in place remains unchanged over time. We provide detailed evidence
in support of both of these identifying assumptions in Section 5.3.
5.2 Baseline Results
Table 3 presents estimates of our baseline speciﬁcation (3). In Column 1 we measure social
connections with the dummy variable DCift that equals 1 if worker i is connected to any of the
managers in ﬁeld-day ft and 0 otherwise. This is the variable used for the previous descriptive
evidence in Table 2. The results show that the pattern of unconditional diﬀerences in worker
33As ﬁelds are operated on at diﬀerent parts of the season, and not all workers pick each day, the eﬀects of the
ﬁeld life cycle and workers’ picking experience can be separately identiﬁed from that of the time trend. The average
ﬁeld life cycle is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent under the two managerial compensation schemes.
34Clustering the disturbance terms uift by ﬁeld-day — say because workers on the same ﬁeld-day face common
productivity shocks — leads to the standard errors on the parameters of interest, γ0 and γ1, being considerably
smaller than those we report.
18productivity by social connections and managerial incentive scheme is robust to conditioning on a
rich set of determinants of worker productivity. In particular, Column 1 shows that when managers
are paid a ﬁxed wage, the average worker has signiﬁcantly higher productivity on ﬁeld-days on
which he is socially connected to his managers (  γ0 > 0). When managers are paid performance
bonuses, there is no eﬀect on the average worker’s productivity of being socially connected to her
managers on the ﬁeld-day (  γ1 = 0).
The magnitude of   γ0 implies that when managers are paid a ﬁxed wage, being connected to
at least one manager on the ﬁeld, increases productivity by 5% for the average worker, whereas
there is no such eﬀect when managers are paid performance bonuses, although the diﬀerence in
the eﬀects is not statistically signiﬁcant.
In Column 2 we measure social connections by the share of managers on ﬁeld-day ft that
are connected to worker i by either nationality, living site, or arrival cohort. Compared to the
dummy variable DCift, this is a more precise measure as it distinguishes between ﬁeld-days in
which a worker is more likely to be connected to his manager. The pattern of coeﬃcients is the
same as in Column 1 but the implied magnitude of the eﬀect is larger. Evaluating at the mean,
the magnitude of   γ0 implies that when managers are paid a ﬁxed wage, the productivity of a
worker on ﬁeld-days when he is socially connected to all the managers on the ﬁeld relative to his
productivity on ﬁeld-days when he is socially unconnected to managers, will be .642kg/hr higher,
other things equal. Relative to a baseline average worker productivity of 7.21kg/hr when managers
are paid ﬁxed wages and workers are not connected, this represents a 9% increase of productivity
on connected days. Since workers are paid piece rates based on productivity, earnings increase by
the same percentage.35,36
Taken together, this pattern of results suggests the eﬀect of social connections in the workplace
is for managers to favor workers they are connected to when their incentives are low powered. At
the foot of Columns 1 and 2 we report the implied diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimate, (  γ0 −   γ1). In
line with the descriptive evidence, this is positive in both cases and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero at the 1% signiﬁcance level when using the continuous measure of social connections.
The pattern of coeﬃcients helps rule out three alternative hypotheses of why social connec-
tions may matter in this workplace. First, if workers were always assigned to socially connected
35The diﬀerence between the estimated   γ0 parameters in Columns 1 and 2 lends support to the idea that managers
and workers do not choose who they work with, even within a ﬁeld-day. Namely, if managers favor socially connected
workers and workers could sort across managers within the ﬁeld, workers should assign themselves to a manager
they are socially connected to, if such a manager is present. In that case, however, the eﬀect of being connected to
one manager should be no diﬀerent than being connected to two or more. The fact that the implied eﬀect of being
connected to all managers (from Column 2) is almost double the eﬀect of being connected to at least one (from
Column 1), indicates that workers cannot assign themselves to a manager whom they are connected to.
36While these baseline results focus on the eﬀects of social connections on worker productivity, we also explored
whether the strength of social ties between a worker and his managers aﬀect worker productivity. We can deﬁne




that a worker’s productivity is monotonically increasing in the number of dimensions along which he is connected
to his managers when his managers are paid a ﬁxed wage, and there is no such eﬀect under performance bonuses.
However, these results should be interpreted with caution because, given that each dimension of connectivity is
orthogonal to the others, there are only 5% of observations from which the eﬀects of being connected along strictly
more than one dimension can be identiﬁed.
19managers when productivity on the ﬁeld is exogenously higher, connections should have the same
positive eﬀect under both schemes, i.e.   γ0 =   γ1 > 0. Second, if when they are on the ﬁeld-day
with managers they are socially connected to, workers prefer to socialize with their managers,
connections should have the same negative eﬀect under both schemes, i.e.   γ0 =   γ1 < 0. Third, the
pattern of coeﬃcients allows us to rule out the hypothesis that the eﬀect of social connections is
driven by workers’ rather than managers’ behavior. Indeed, if workers were to internalize the eﬀect
of their eﬀort on their manager’s pay when socially connected to her, we would observe workers
exerting more eﬀort when this actually aﬀects the manager’s pay, namely when the manager is
paid the performance bonus, i.e.   γ0 = 0 <   γ1.
A concern with these results is that the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimate of social connections
might be picking up heterogeneous eﬀects of the managerial bonus scheme across workers that
are unrelated to workers’ social connections. To account for this we introduce a complete set of
interactions between each worker’s ﬁxed eﬀect and the performance bonus dummy. This ﬂexibly
captures any diﬀerential eﬀects across workers of the change in managerial incentives. The result,
reported in Column 3, shows that the magnitude and signiﬁcance of the parameters of interest are
similar to those in the baseline estimates.37
Finally, we address the concern that there may exist ﬁeld-day factors that create a spurious
correlation between social connections and productivity. For example, managers might lobby the
COO to be allocated workers they are connected to on ﬁeld-days when productivity is exogenously
higher. Also, the eﬀect of social connections might depend on the ﬁeld-day piece rate, which is on
average lower when managers are paid performance bonuses as shown in Bandiera et al (2007).
To address this concern the ﬁnal speciﬁcation includes ﬁeld-day ﬁxed eﬀects. The eﬀects of social
connections Cift under each managerial incentive scheme are then identiﬁed oﬀ the variation across
workers in the same ﬁeld-day in the level of their social connections in deviation from the workers’
average level of social connections under each managerial compensation scheme. The result in
Column 4 shows the previous results to be robust to conditioning on factors that vary across ﬁeld-
days, such as managers lobbying for workers, ﬁeld conditions, the hours worked on the ﬁeld-day,
or the level of the piece rate for workers.38
5.3 Evidence in Support of the Identifying Assumptions
We have identiﬁed the causal eﬀect of social connections on worker productivity under each man-
agerial incentive scheme by comparing the productivity of a given worker on ﬁeld-days when he is
socially connected to his manager to his productivity on ﬁeld-days when he is unconnected. The
validity of the identiﬁcation strategy and the causal interpretation given to the results relies on
two assumptions.
37The results are robust to controlling for a complete set of worker-ﬁeld dummies, that allow the productivity of
each worker to diﬀer across ﬁelds.
38To ensure the estimates do not capture the eﬀect of the composition of the workforce changing over the season,
throughout we restrict the sample to workers that work at least one week either side of the change in managerial
incentives. The results are robust to less conservative sample deﬁnitions, namely to including all workers on payroll
or only workers that have worked at least one day either side of the change in managerial incentives.
20The ﬁrst is that unobserved determinants of workers’ allocation to managers are orthogonal to
the managerial incentive scheme in place. As discussed in Section 2.2, the within worker variation
in social connections is exogenous to the behavior of workers and managers because the allocation
of individuals to ﬁelds is determined by the COO, based on the demand for labor for picking and
non-picking tasks across ﬁelds. Nevertheless, workers’ allocation to managers might still depend
on factors that aﬀect performance and are observable to the COO. Alternatively, workers and
managers might engage in behaviors to inﬂuence their assignment to each other.
To provide support for this identifying assumption, the Appendix presents evidence that the
allocation rules do not change with the change in managerial incentives. We show that — (i)
compared to workers who are not connected to any manager, connected workers are equally likely
to be selected to pick, or to be selected to work on any task as opposed to stay unemployed on a
given day, regardless of the incentive scheme in place; (ii) ﬁeld-day and worker-ﬁeld-day speciﬁc
determinants of productivity do not predict the level of social connections Cift diﬀerentially under
the two managerial incentive schemes; (iii) all managers are equally likely to be assigned connected
workers underboth incentive schemes; (iv) we exploit the fact that some dimensions of connectivity,
such as nationality, are more easily observable to the COO than others, such as time of arrival. If
the COO systematically assigns workers to managers on the basis of their connections, we should
ﬁnd the eﬀect of social connections to be mostly driven by dimensions that are easier to observe.
We ﬁnd no evidence to support this assertion.
The second underlying identifying assumption is that the eﬀect of social connections on indi-
vidual productivity does not change over time for reasons other than the change in managerial
incentives. This ensures that there are no time-varying unobservables that — (i) are correlated with
the introduction of the bonus, and, (ii) determine the eﬀect of social connections on productivity.
The Appendix shows two pieces of evidence in support of this assumption. First we show
that the eﬀect of social connections does not depend on the time of the season, the ﬁeld life cycle
or the workers’ tenure. Rather, the eﬀect of social connections changes discontinuously when
the bonus is introduced.39 Second, we analyze the eﬀect of a placebo bonus on productivity in
a diﬀerent season (2004), and in diﬀerent ﬁelds within the 2003 season, neither of which were
subject to the introduction of managerial performance pay. Reassuringly, the eﬀect of connections
on productivity does not change with the introduction of the placebo bonus, suggesting the eﬀect
of social connections does not change spuriously at a speciﬁc point in time or in the ﬁeld life cycle
that happens to coincide with the introduction of the performance bonus in 2003.
39A related concern is that the overall eﬀect of social connections through time might mask heterogeneous eﬀects
for the three diﬀerent components of the connection measure. Further speciﬁcations, not reported for reasons of
space, reveal that the eﬀect of each component does not vary with time and changes discontinuously when bonuses
are introduced.
216 The Eﬀect of Social Connections on the Firm’s Perfor-
mance
We have presented evidence that the average worker beneﬁts from being connected to his manager
— in terms of his productivity and hence earnings — only when managers are subject to low powered
incentives. In contrast, there are no such beneﬁts to being socially connected to managers when
they are paid performance bonuses. As highlighted by the theoretical framework in Section 3, two
interpretations on managerial behavior are consistent with the ﬁndings.
First it might be that when managers are paid wages, they only devote eﬀort to connected
workers, whereas when they are paid bonuses they increase the overall level of eﬀort and devote
some to every worker. Second, it might be that when managers are paid wages, they only devote
eﬀort to connected workers whereas when they are paid bonuses they reallocate their, possibly
higher, eﬀort towards high ability workers irrespective of whether they are socially connected to
them or not.
Distinguishing between these interpretations is key to assess the eﬀect of social connections on
the ﬁrm’s overall productivity. If the data support the ﬁrst interpretation, the implication is that
social connections do not distort the allocation of managerial eﬀort and have a positive eﬀect on
ﬁrm’s productivity because they increase managerial eﬀort. To the contrary, if the data support
the second interpretation, the interpretation is that social connections lead to a misallocation of
managerial eﬀort that decreases the ﬁrm’s productivity. The theoretical framework makes clear
that such an allocation eﬀect might reduce the ﬁrm’s productivity when the manager is connected
to low ability workers and targets them instead of the high ability workers. To assess whether
this is the case, we proceed in two stages. In Section 6.1 we assess whether the allocation eﬀect
is negative, namely we estimate the eﬀect of social connections on connected workers of diﬀerent
ability by managerial incentive scheme, and test whether the manager reallocates eﬀort from low
to high ability workers as a result of the increase in the strength of her incentives. In Section 6.2
we present evidence on the overall eﬀect of social connections on the ﬁrm’s performance, so as to
assess whether the positive incentive eﬀect prevails over the (possibly) negative allocation eﬀect.
6.1 The Allocation Eﬀect
6.1.1 Quantile Regression Estimates
To explore whether the eﬀects of social connections are heterogeneous across workers, we use
quantile regression methods to estimate the conditional distribution of the log of productivity of
worker i on ﬁeld f on day t, yift, at diﬀerent quantiles, θ. We therefore estimate the following
speciﬁcation,
Quantθ(yift|.) = αθBt + βθCift + γθ (Bt × Cift) + λθf +
 
s∈Mft
 θsSsft + δθXift + ηθZft + ϕθt, (4)
22where all variables are as previously deﬁned, and bootstrapped standard errors based on 1000
replications are calculated throughout. The eﬀect of the managerial performance bonus on un-
connected ﬁeld-days at the θth conditional quantile of log worker productivity is measured by αθ.
The corresponding eﬀect on connected ﬁeld-days is given by αθ + γθCift. Since the connection
variable Cift is continuous, we deﬁne worker i to be connected on ﬁeld-day ft when the share
of managers he is connected to is higher than a given threshold,   Cift, and we experiment with
alternative values of the threshold. The eﬀect of social connections when managers are paid ﬁxed
wages and bonuses are captured by βθ and βθ + γθ, respectively.
The estimates of αθ and (αθ + γθCift) at diﬀerent conditional quantiles of worker productivity
allows us to distinguish between the two interpretations given above. Indeed, if social connections
do not distort the allocation of eﬀort but rather the manager targets connected workers before
the bonus and exerts additional eﬀort to target all workers after the bonus, we should observe the
eﬀect of the bonus to be non-negative and stronger on ﬁeld-days when the worker is not connected,
that is αθ > αθ + γθ   Cift ≥ 0 for all θ.
In contrast, if social connections distort the allocation of eﬀort and this is detrimental to the
ﬁrm’s productivity we should observe that managers reallocate eﬀort from low ability workers
when connected to high ability workers regardless of their connection status. This implies — (i)
the introduction of the bonus strictly decreases the productivity of workers in the left tail of the
productivity distribution on ﬁeld-days in which they are connected and has no eﬀect when they
are not connected, namely αθ +γθ   Cift < 0 and αθ = 0 for low θ; (ii) the introduction of the bonus
strictly increases the productivity of workers in the right tail of the productivity distribution
on ﬁeld-days in which they are not connected and has a weakly positive eﬀect when they are
connected, namely αθ > αθ + γθ   Cift ≥ 0 for high θ.
Table 4 reports the estimates of αθ, βθ, γθ, and αθ+ γθ   Cift from speciﬁcation (4) at various
quantiles, and where   Cift is set at the sample mean. Two points are of note. First, the eﬀect
of the managerial bonus on unconnected ﬁeld-days, αθ, is zero at the bottom two quantiles and
positive and increasing in θ for the top quantiles. Second, the eﬀect of the managerial bonus on
connected ﬁeld-days, αθ +γθ   Cift, is negative and signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst two quantiles and positive
and signiﬁcant in the last two quantiles.40
Taken together, these results provide evidence against the interpretation that after the in-
troduction of the bonus, managers exert extra eﬀort and target all workers regardless of their
connection status. Rather the data suggests the introduction of the bonus strictly decreases the
productivity of workers in the left tail of the productivity distribution on ﬁeld-days in which they
are connected and has no eﬀect when they are not connected. The ﬁndings unambiguously provide
support to the interpretation that social connections distort the allocation of eﬀort when managers
are paid ﬁxed wages and that this allocation eﬀect is detrimental for the ﬁrm’s productivity.41
40As the eﬀect of the bonus on both connected and unconnected ﬁeld-days is increasing in θ, the evidence is not
consistent with the hypothesis that workers work harder to increase the probability of being selected to pick once
the bonus is introduced. If such ‘rat race’ eﬀects were responsible for the productivity increase, we should observe
workers at the margin of being selected to be most aﬀected.
41The results are qualitatively unchanged if we set the threshold ¯ Cift to — (i) the sample minimum of Cift, so
236.1.2 Fixed Eﬀects Estimates
To complement the quantile regression evidence, we estimate the productivity eﬀect of social
connections, of the managerial bonus, and of their interaction, individually for each worker. To




ΛiftDi + λf + ρXift + ηZft + ϕt +
 
s∈Mft
 sSsft + uift, (5)
where Di equals one for worker i, and is zero otherwise, and all other variables are as previously
deﬁned. To explore heterogeneous eﬀects across workers we deﬁne,
Λift = αi [DCift × (1 − Bt)]+βi [DCift × Bt]+γi[(1 − Bt) × (1 − DCift)]+δi [Bt × (1 − DCift)].
(6)
For each worker we therefore estimate four parameters that capture his residual productivity
on ﬁeld-days when he is — (i) connected and managers are paid wages (αi); (ii) connected and
managers are paid bonuses (βi); (iii) unconnected and managers are paid ﬁxed wages (γi); (iv)
unconnected and managers are paid bonuses (δi). Figure 1 shows the kernel density estimates of
the four estimates of residual productivity.
Panels (a) and (b) showthe eﬀect of being socially connected to managers fora given managerial
compensation scheme. Panel (a) shows that when managers are paid ﬁxed wages, the entire
distribution of conditional productivity shifts to the right on ﬁeld-days in which workers are
connected compared to when they are not connected. The p-value of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test for the null of equality of distributions is .01.
Panel (b) shows that when managers are paid performance bonuses, the distributions of condi-
tional productivity on connected and unconnected ﬁeld-days overlap. In this case, the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test fails to reject the null at conventional levels of signiﬁcance. Panels (a) and (b)
together conﬁrm the previous ﬁndings that being connected increases workers’ conditional pro-
ductivity when managers are paid a ﬁxed wage while it has no discernible eﬀect when managers
are paid performance bonuses.
To assess whether social connections distort the manager’s allocation of eﬀort and whether
this is detrimental for productivity, we analyze whether managers reallocate eﬀort from low abil-
ity workers on connected ﬁeld-days to high ability workers on unconnected ﬁeld-days after the
introduction of the bonus. In line with the quantile regression estimates, panel (c) shows that on
ﬁeld-days when the worker is connected, the distribution of conditional productivity has a thicker
left tail and the p-value of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is .04. Panel (c) thus indicates that the
introduction of the managerial performance bonus reduces the productivity of low ability workers
who were previously targeted when managers were paid wages. Note also that on ﬁeld-days when
the worker is connected, the distribution of conditional productivity has a higher variance when
that a worker is deﬁned to be connected as long as he is connected to one of the managers; (ii) the sample maximum
of Cift, so that a worker is deﬁned to be connected only if he is connected to all managers on the ﬁeld-day.
24managers are paid bonuses compared to when they are paid ﬁxed wages. This illustrates that
social connections reduce the variation in productivity naturally arising from diﬀerences in worker
ability when managers are paid ﬁxed wages but not when they are paid bonuses.
Finally, panel (d) illustrates the eﬀect of the introduction of the bonus on unconnected ﬁeld-
days. In line with the previous estimates, on unconnected ﬁeld-days the distribution of conditional
productivity has a thicker right tail when managers are paid bonuses compared to when they are
paid ﬁxed wages — the p-value of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is .06. This is consistent with the
introduction of the bonus increasing the productivity of high ability workers who were previously
untargeted on ﬁeld-days when they were unconnected and managers were paid wages.
Overall, panels (c) and (d) are in line with the quantile regressions results and provide support
to the interpretation that when managers are paid ﬁxed wages they favor connected workers and
that this allocation of managerial eﬀort is detrimental for the ﬁrm’s overall productivity.
6.1.3 Further Evidence
The balance of evidence indicates that following the introduction of the bonus managers reallocate
eﬀort from low ability connected workers to high ability unconnected workers, rather than devot-
ing more eﬀort towards all workers. This is consistent with the characteristics of the production
technology in our setting. Indeed, as each manager is responsible for twenty workers distributed
over one hectare, it is often impossible for her to target her eﬀort towards all workers simultane-
ously. The technology is such that managerial eﬀort is a rival good in that if the manager decides
to target her eﬀort towards one worker, she necessarily does so at the expense of another worker.
A testable implication of this property is that if favors are rival, the eﬀect of social connections
on the productivity of worker i should be smaller when the share of his co-workers who are also
connected to managers, increases. In short, if few workers are connected, the manager can devote
all of her time to favor them. If more workers are connected, the manager needs to spread her
favors more thinly. To check for this we re-estimated our baseline speciﬁcation (3), allowing the
eﬀect of social connections on the productivity of worker i on ﬁeld-day ft to vary with the share
of workers who are also connected to a manager on ﬁeld-day ft. We ﬁnd that when managers
are paid ﬁxed wages, social connections increase the productivity of a connected worker by 15%
if one quarter of the workers on the ﬁeld are also connected, by 7% if half of the workers on the
ﬁeld are also connected, and have no eﬀect if more than two thirds of the workers on the ﬁeld
are also connected. In line with previous evidence, neither the connection status of worker i nor
the share of connected workers on the same ﬁeld-day aﬀect productivity after the introduction of
managerial performance pay.
6.2 The Overall Eﬀect on Average Field-Day Productivity
The evidence above indicates that, when managers are paid ﬁxed wages, social connections distort
the allocation of managerial eﬀort in favor of connected workers at the expense of high ability
workers. This, together with the fact that when they are paid performance bonuses they allocate
25eﬀort to high ability workers only, indicate that the allocation eﬀect is detrimental for the ﬁrm’s
performance. We now present evidence on the overall eﬀect of social connections, namely we
investigate whether the extent to which social connection increase managerial eﬀort is suﬃcient
to overcome the negative allocation eﬀect. To do so, we aggregate the data at the ﬁeld-day level
and estimate a speciﬁcation analogous to (3),
  yft = κ0 (1 − Bt) ×   Cft + κ1
 





 sSsft + ηZft + ϕt + λf + uift, (7)
where   yft is the log of the average productivity on ﬁeld-day ft,   Cft is the share of managers worker i
is socially connected to, averaged across all workers on ﬁeld-day ft, Bt is a dummy variable equal
to 1 after the performance bonus is introduced (June 27th), and 0 otherwise,
 
s∈Mft
 sSsft is a
full set of managers dummies, Zft is the ﬁeld-life cycle and t is a time trend, as in the baseline
speciﬁcation (3). The parameters of interest are κ0, which measures the eﬀect of social connections
on average productivity when managers are paid a ﬁxed wage, and κ1 , which measures the eﬀect
of social connections when managers are paid performance bonuses. The ﬁndings, reported in
Table 5, indicate that the overall eﬀect of social connections is negative when managers are paid
ﬁxed wages, and zero when they are paid performance bonuses. An increase in average social
connections by one standard deviation reduces average productivity by 8% unconditionally and
by 5% in the full conditional speciﬁcation (7) when mangers are paid ﬁxed wages. The eﬀect of
social connections under the bonus is small, and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than zero. Given our
previous ﬁnding that the allocation eﬀect is negative when managers are paid wages and zero when
they are paid bonuses, the results in Table 5 imply the eﬀect of social connections on managerial
eﬀort might be positive, albeit not very large, in the ﬁxed wage regime only. The next section
discusses how the ﬁnding that social connections are detrimental to the overall ﬁrm productivity
might depend on speciﬁc features of the context we study.
7 Discussion
We have provided evidence on the interplay between social connections, incentives, and produc-
tivity within a ﬁrm. We show that in a setting where managerial eﬀort can be targeted to aﬀect
the productivity and earnings of individual workers, the existence of social connections between
individuals at diﬀerent tiers of the ﬁrm hierarchy aﬀects individual and ﬁrm performance.
We ﬁnd that managers target connected workers, but only when their monetary incentives
are low powered. After the introduction of managerial performance pay, managers stop favoring
low ability workers they are socially connected to, and target their eﬀort towards high ability
workers instead. The results indicate that while social connections can increase the productivity
of connected workers, their eﬀect on the allocation of managerial eﬀort is detrimental for the ﬁrm’s
productivity overall under the ﬁxed wage regime.
Our results bring new evidence to the small but growing literature that highlights the impor-
26tance of social relationships in the workplace. Our ﬁndings indicate that managerial behavior is
shaped by both their social connections with their subordinates and their monetary incentives.
Both factors are key to explaining the success of existing incentive structures and to guide the
design of optimal compensation schemes for both workers and managers.
The use of detailed personnel data combined with the purely exogenous variation created by
our natural ﬁeld experiment allows us to precisely identify the causal eﬀect of social connections
between workers and managers on the performance of individual workers, and on the ﬁrm’s per-
formance overall. Precision, however, inevitably comes at the cost of a loss of generality, because
the ﬁrm we study, as any other, has unique features that shape social connections between workers
and managers, and their eﬀect on productivity. The following features of this work environment
are particularly noteworthy for the external validity of this study.
First, there are two characteristics of this ﬁrm that have opposite eﬀects on the probability
that social connections form and are strong enough to aﬀect behavior. On the one hand, the fact
that managers and workers are of similar ages and backgrounds and live on the farm site for the
entire duration of their stay increase the likelihood that they form strong social connections with
one another. On the other hand, as managers and workers are employed on short term seasonal
contracts, this might prevent the formation of meaningful long-run social ties relative to other
settings.
Second, in our setting all the actions managers can take to help connected workers — allocating
them to better rows, reallocating them quickly to new rows, providing them with new crates as
soon as needed — are costlessly observed by others on the ﬁeld. To the extent that favoritism is
disapproved of by unconnected workers, the fact that these actions are observable by all workers
reduce managers’ ability to favor their friends. We thus expect the eﬀect of social connections and
favoritism to be stronger in settings where favoritism can be more easily disguised.
Third, the speciﬁc form that the eﬀects of social connections take depends on the technology
and incentive schemes in the workplace. In our context workers are paid piece rates and managers
can undertake actions that improve the productivity and hence earnings of connected workers.
In other contexts in which workers are paid ﬁxed wages, social connections might be exploited
to allow subordinates to slack, allocating subordinates to more desirable positions, or helping
subordinates be promoted. Moreover, in our context workers’ productivity is precisely measured,
so there is also no scope for managers to show favoritism through subjective evaluations of workers.
In general, managers will have more margins along which to favor workers and all such activities
will aﬀect the ﬁrm’s overall performance.
Perhaps the most important consideration is that in other settings, the allocative eﬀect of
social connections on managerial eﬀort might be beneﬁcial. As emphasized throughout, social
connections can reduce informational asymmetries, facilitate joint problem solving, and provide
managers the ability to motivate workers through social rewards and punishments. In our con-
text, the tasks workers undertake are relatively simple and so any potential beneﬁts that social
connections have for problem solving or improved communication more generally, are likely to be
small. In other settings, the productivity enhancing eﬀects of social connections might dominate
27the ineﬃciency due to favoritism. For example Ichniowski and Shaw (2005) present evidence from
steel ﬁnishing lines — a relatively complex task that involves problem solving — of such positive
eﬀects of improved communication within and between tiers of the ﬁrm hierarchy.42
The fact that managers devote eﬀort to increase the productivity of connected workers, even
when they are paid ﬁxed wages, suggests that social connections between managers and workers can
provide an alternative, and possibly cheaper, mechanism to the provision of monetary incentives.
It may thus be in a ﬁrm’s best interests to foster social ties between management and workers.
Indeed many ﬁrms are observed devoting resources towards such bonding exercises. Relatedly, the
fact that managers behave as if they derive utility from helping connected workers, implies that
being socially connected to their subordinates lowers the managers’ participation constraint and
thus the ﬁrm’s wage bill may be reduced. However, this strategy may be suboptimal if it leads to
the self selection of lower quality managers to the ﬁrm over time.43
More generally, our ﬁndings provide support to the idea that interplays between social rela-
tionships and incentives within ﬁrms need to be taken into account, in order to understand how
individuals respond to a given set of incentives, and to understand the optimal set of incentives
within an organization. Diﬀerences in the social organization of the workplace might therefore
explain part of the productivity diﬀerences among otherwise observationally similar ﬁrms.
8 Appendix
8.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: As the manager’s pay-oﬀ function (b + σh)θk(σh)mh+(b + σl)k(σl)ml−
C(mh+ml) is linear in (mh,ml) the manager will target only the worker that yields the highest mar-
ginal beneﬁt.44 The manager chooses   m if and only if {max[θkh (b + σh),kl (b + σl)]}(  m−1) > c.
The right hand side is increasing in (σh,σl), which proves the ﬁrst part of the proposition, that
the existence of social connections weakly increases the level of managerial eﬀort.
The manager allocates her eﬀort to worker i if and only if (b + σi)θk(σi) ≥ (b + σj)k(σj).
There are two cases to consider. If σh = σ and σl ∈ {σ,0}, that is if the manager is socially
connected to both workers, or only the high ability worker, she targets the high ability worker for
all other parameter values. If σh = 0 < σl = σ, that is if the manager is connected only to the low
ability worker, she targets the high ability worker if and only if k < bθ
b+σ. This proves the second
part of the proposition, that there exists a part of the parameter space in which the existence of
42Relatedly, Nagin et al (2002) present evidence from a ﬁeld experiment in a call centre that exogenously varied the
probability that employees would be monitored by managers. Their results suggest that management’s “perceived
empathy and fairness” in dealing with employees may play an important role in reducing workplace opportunism.
Other beneﬁcial eﬀects of social capital within ﬁrms has also been discussed in the sociology literature. These
include potentially better hiring outcomes through the use of referrals by current employees (Fernandez et al 2000).
43Social connections within ﬁrms are just one alternative to using monetary incentives to solve agency problems.
There is a growing theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation
(Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 1997, Kreps 1997, Benabou and Tirole 2003).
44This property would of course be retained if workers also chose their eﬀort level. The analysis would however
be more cumbersome as the worker’s eﬀort level would depend on the manager’s and vice versa.
28social connections alters the allocation of managerial eﬀort in favor of the worker the manager is
connected to.￿
Proof of Proposition 2: As m is weakly increasing in (σh,σl) and the ﬁrm’s average productivity,
1
2(θk(σh)mh+ k(σl)ml), is increasing in m, the levels eﬀect of social connections is weakly positive.
For any given level of eﬀort, if σh = σ and σl ∈ {σ,0}, then the manager targets the high
ability worker only and the allocation eﬀect is positive as productivity is equal to θkmh > θmh.
This proves the ﬁrst part of the proposition that if the manager is connected to the high ability
worker, the eﬀect of social connections on the ﬁrm’s productivity is unambiguously positive.
If σh = 0 < σl = σ and bθ
b+σ < k < θ, the allocation eﬀect is negative, namely the manager tar-
gets the low ability worker although targeting the high ability worker would yield higher output.45
The net eﬀect of the existence of social connections on the ﬁrm’s productivity then depends on
the balance between the levels eﬀect and the allocation eﬀect. If m(σh = 0,σl = 0) = m(σh =
0,σl = σ), namely if the manager chooses the same level of eﬀort regardless of social connections,
the allocation eﬀect dominates and the eﬀect of social connections is unambiguously negative. If
m(σh = 0,σl = 0) < m(σh = 0,σl = σ), the ﬁrm’s productivity is equal to θ when σh = 0,σl = 0
and k   m when σh = 0,σl = σ. This proves the second part of the proposition that if the man-
ager is connected only to the low ability worker and targets him, social connections reduce ﬁrm’s
productivity if k < θ
¯ m.￿
8.2 Identiﬁcation: The COO’s Allocation Algorithm
We present evidence in support of the ﬁrst identifying assumption that the allocation algorithm
used by the COO to assign workers to tasks, and workers to managers does not change with the
introduction of managerial performance bonuses. We proceed in four steps. First we compare
the allocation of the connected workers we focus on for our main analysis, to the allocation of
unconnected workers. Second, we analyze the determinants of the level of social connections Cift
and test whether their eﬀect changes after the change in incentive scheme. Third we test whether
the COO is more likely to assign connected workers to some managers rather than others, and
whether this changes after the change in incentive scheme. Finally, we exploit the fact that some
dimensions of connectivity, such as nationality, are more easily observable to the COO than others,
such as time of arrival. If such sorting biases the estimates, we should ﬁnd the eﬀect of social
connections to be mostly driven by dimensions that are easier to observe.
8.2.1 Connected Versus Unconnected Workers
We estimate the probability of a given worker being selected into employment by the COO while
controlling for farm level variables that aﬀect the probability of being hired independently of the
incentive scheme in place. These farm level variables measure the supply and demand of labor.
45Total output is equal to θm when the manager is not connected to either worker and is equal to km when she
is connected to the low ability worker. Thus, for any level of m, output is lower when the manager is connected.
29We measure labor supply using personnel records on the number of workers available for hire
on the farm on any given day. We measure the demand for labor using the total daily fruit yield on
each site on the farm. The total yield is orthogonal to the incentive scheme as it is determined by
planting decisions taken one or two years earlier. Fields are located on two sites, of which we use
the largest for the analysis as fruit in the smaller site begins to ripen only after the introduction
of the performance bonus scheme. However, as both sites hire workers from the same pool, we
control for yields in each site separately. We then estimate the following conditional logit model,
where observations are grouped by worker,





pit = 1 if worker i is selected by the COO to pick on day t on the main site, and 0 if they are
assigned to non-picking tasks. Bt is the performance bonus dummy, Ci is a dummy variable equal
to one if worker i is socially connected to any of the managers along any dimension of nationality,
arrival cohort, and living site, and is zero otherwise. XD
t and XS
t proxy the demand and supply
of labor on day t. To allow for a workers’ previous performance to aﬀect their probability of
being selected, Xit measures worker i’s productivity on the last day she picked, in percentage
deviation from the mean productivity on that day, to remove the eﬀects of factors that determine
the productivity of all workers and are beyond the worker’s control.46
All continuous variables are divided by their standard deviations so that one unit increase can
be interpreted as an increase of one standard deviation. We report odds ratios throughout, and
standard errors are calculated using the delta method.
Column 1 of Table A1 shows that, other things equal, there is no diﬀerential eﬀect on socially
connected or unconnected workers of being selected to pick fruit after the introduction of the
managerial performance bonus. Namely the coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one. The
other coeﬃcients show that, as expected, workers are more likely to be assigned to fruit picking
tasks on days in which the ﬁelds on the main site bears more fruit (namely, the coeﬃcient of XD
t is
signiﬁcantly larger than one) and on days in which they face less competition from other workers
(namely, the coeﬃcient of XS
t is signiﬁcantly smaller than one).
Conditional on not being selected to pick on the main site on a given day, a worker can either
be assigned to other tasks on the main site, to work on the other site, or be left unemployed for
the day. The next speciﬁcation checks whether the assignment of workers to non-picking tasks
varies diﬀerentially by socially connected and unconnected workers, when the performance bonus
is introduced. The result in Column 2 again shows there to be no such diﬀerential eﬀect of the
COO’s decision across workers based on their social connection to managers. The pattern of other
coeﬃcients conﬁrms that the introduction of the bonus scheme signiﬁcantly raises the probability
of being unemployed. As expected, the probability of being unemployed for the day is lower when
46We ﬁrst take the deviation of the worker’s productivity from the ﬁeld average productivity on each ﬁeld he
picked on the day he was last selected to pick, and then calculate a weighted average of this across all ﬁelds he
worked on where the weights are based on the number of pickers on the ﬁeld.
30yields are higher and when the stock of available workers is lower.
8.2.2 Determinants of Social Connections
To provide evidence that ﬁeld-day and worker-ﬁeld-day speciﬁc determinants of productivity do
not predict the level of social connections Cift diﬀerently under the two managerial incentive
schemes, we estimate regressions of the form,
Cift = αi + λf + υBt + [(φ0 + φ1Bt) × Xift] + [(ϕ0 + ϕ1Bt) × Zft] +
 
s∈Mft
 sSsft + uift, (9)
where Bt is the bonus dummy, Xift captures worker i’s time varying characteristics and Zft
captures several time-varying ﬁeld characteristics, such as the ﬁeld life cycle, a time trend, worker’s
tenure on the farm, the number of workers on the ﬁeld, the number of managers on the ﬁeld, the
total man hours worked on the ﬁeld, and the total kilos of fruit picked. Our identifying assumption
requires φ1 = ϕ1 = 0. Reassuringly, we fail to reject the null of zero coeﬃcients in all cases.47
8.2.3 The Allocation of Workers to Managers
Finally, we present evidence on whether managers can inﬂuence the composition of the group of
workers they are allocated to, and in particular, whether the composition of workers they are
assigned diﬀers after the change in managerial incentives. To begin with we note that Table 1
indicates that workers are equally likely to be connected to managers under both schemes. This
is inconsistent with the hypothesis that managers can aﬀect the share of connected workers in
their group and choose a diﬀerent share after the introduction of the bonus. To provide further
evidence on this point we test whether some managers are signiﬁcantly more likely to be assigned
connected workers and whether this changes after the introduction of the bonus. Note that since
some nationalities are more numerous than others, some managers are mechanically connected to
more workers. However, we are interested in establishing whether diﬀerent managers are more
or less likely to be assigned to workers they are connected to, regardless of the total number of
workers they are connected to. To do so, we construct a data set at the manager-ﬁeld-day level







vs (Ssft × Bt) + ζsft, (10)
47Three other pieces of evidence also suggest that farm operations do not change over the two halves of the season.
First, the ratio of workers to managers does not change signiﬁcantly, remaining at 20 throughout. Second, at the
ﬁeld-day level, the average share of workers that are socially connected to managers does not change signiﬁcantly
over the two halves of the season, nor does the variation in this share between ﬁelds on the same day. This suggests
workers do not become sorted into ﬁelds by social connections over time. Third, using the estimated worker ﬁxed
eﬀect from (3),   αi, as a measure of a worker’s ability, we ﬁnd that groups of workers on the ﬁeld-day are equally
heterogeneous before and after the change in managerial incentives. Hence there is no evidence the COO sorts
workers diﬀerently by ability into ﬁelds post-bonus.
31where Zmft is the log of the ratio of the number of workers connected to manager m present
on ﬁeld day ft, over the total number of workers connected to manager m who are working on
day t. The numerator thus represents the number of connected workers the manager is assigned
to, whereas the denominator is the number of workers the managers could have potentially been
assigned to on day t. All other controls are as previously deﬁned.
We test two hypotheses — (i) H0 :  s = 0 for all s, namely all managers are equally likely to
be assigned connected workers when they are paid ﬁxed wages, and, (ii) H0 : vs = 0 for all s,
namely the allocation does not change after the introduction of the bonus. The p-values for these
hypotheses are .64 and .94 respectively, so we cannot reject either hypothesis. Hence there is no
evidence the COO treats managers diﬀerently before and after the bonus, or that some managers
are more able to be allocated to connected workers while others are not.
8.2.4 Observability of Social Connections
A ﬁnal check on whether the COO intentionally sorts managers and workers into ﬁelds on the
basis of their social connections is based on the intuition that some dimensions of connectivity,
such as nationality, are more easily observable to the COO than others, such as time of arrival.
If such sorting biases the estimates, we should ﬁnd the eﬀect of social connections to be mostly
driven by dimensions that are easier to observe.
In Table A2 we estimate a speciﬁcation analogous to (3) that separately controls for each
dimension of social connectivity. To compare the magnitudes of the coeﬃcients, we consider
the implied eﬀect on worker productivity of a one standard deviation increase in each of the
connectivity measures from its mean. We ﬁnd that when managers are paid a ﬁxed wage, the
productivity of a given worker is 4.6%, 1.5%, and 3.3% higher when the share of managers he is
connected to by nationality, living site, and arrival cohort respectively, is one standard deviation
higher. The magnitude of the eﬀect is thus similar for dimensions that can be observed — nationality
— and for dimensions that cannot be easily observed — arrival cohort. If we compare the eﬀect
of the same change across diﬀerent connection measures, the magnitude of the eﬀect is actually
the largest for the dimension that is least observable — arrival cohort. This provides further
evidence against the hypothesis that the COO sorts managers and workers into ﬁelds on the basis
of their social connections. Finally, social connections along any dimension do not aﬀect worker
productivity when managers are paid a performance bonus.48
8.3 Identiﬁcation: Time Eﬀects
We now present evidence in support of the second identifying assumption that any eﬀect of social
connections on individual productivity unrelated to the managerial incentive scheme in place,
remains unchanged over time. If not, then in the baseline speciﬁcation (3),   γ0 and   γ1 may simply
48We chose to measure social connections along the dimensions of nationality, living site and time of arrival in
order to capture social links that form for diﬀerent reasons and, indeed the correlation among the three measures is
very low. In line with this we ﬁnd that their estimated eﬀect on productivity to be the same, regardless of whether
they are included together or one at the time.
32pick up that the eﬀect of social connections naturally dies out over time, rather than because
managers change their behavior when they are paid performance bonuses. For example, managers
may initially favor some workers in order to befriend them. Similarly workers may initially work
hard under some managers in order to befriend them. This would explain the pattern of coeﬃcients
we ﬁnd in the data and then suggest social connections do not distort managerial eﬀort in the
long run.
In Table A3 we analyze whether the eﬀects of social connections on worker productivity natu-
rally disappear over time. In Column 1 we split both the pre and post performance bonus periods
into halves and allow the eﬀect of connections to change within the pre and post bonus periods.
Intuitively, if the eﬀect of social connections were naturally declining over time we would expect it
to be higher in the ﬁrst half of the pre-bonus period than in the second half, and again, higher in
the ﬁrst half of the post-bonus period than in the second half. Column 1 shows that, in contrast,
there is no change in the eﬀect of social connections within each period. Rather the eﬀect of
social connections on worker productivity disappears discontinuously with the introduction of the
performance bonus for managers.
A second concern is that   γ0 and   γ1 might pick up that later in the ﬁeld life cycle there is less
variation in the fruit available across diﬀerent rows, and so managers have no means by which to
favor connected workers, even though they prefer to do so. To check for this, in Column 2 we
allow the eﬀect of social connections to vary with a ﬁeld speciﬁc time trend — the ﬁeld life cycle.
We do not ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant evidence that the eﬀect of social connections diminishes
within a ﬁeld over time.
A third time related concern is that the true social ties between a worker and his managers are
measured with error using Cift which is based on three particular dimensions. This measurement
error is non-classical because it increases over time if workers learn they are better oﬀ being
socially connected to managers, and so invest more into forming social ties with managers over
time, irrespective of whether they are of the same nationality, living site, and arrival cohort. If
so, we should ﬁnd the eﬀect of Cift to diminish with the time the worker has spent on the farm.
In Column 3 we allow the eﬀect of social connections to vary with a worker speciﬁc time trend —
the number of days the worker has been present on the farm. There is no signiﬁcant evidence of
such eﬀects, although the interaction terms are not precisely estimated.
Overall, the evidence in Columns 1 to 3 indicates that the eﬀect of social connections does
not decline smoothly with time, ﬁeld speciﬁc trends, or worker speciﬁc trends. Rather there is
a discontinuous eﬀect of social connections on worker performance at the time when managerial
performance bonuses were introduced. Given that we had full control over the timing of this
change, our experimental research design ensures that the exact date on which the managerial
incentive schemes changed is uncorrelated with any determinants of individual productivity.
To provide further support, Columns 4 and 5 report the results of two placebo tests. Column
4 uses ﬁelds that were picked only after the introduction of the bonus and are therefore excluded
from our main sample. Given that in our sample the bonus is introduced when the average (and
median) ﬁeld is half the way through its life cycle, we deﬁne a placebo bonus dummy to be equal
33to zero if the ﬁeld is in the ﬁrst half of its life cycle and equal to one if it is in the second half.
The results in Column 4 indicate that social connections have no eﬀect on worker productivity
either side of the placebo dummy, thus ruling out that our previous results were due to the eﬀect
of social connections naturally disappearing once ﬁelds have reached half of their life cycle.
Column 5 uses data from the same tasks in the same farm one year later — namely in 2004,
when the managers were paid ﬁxed wages throughout the season. We deﬁne the placebo bonus
dummy to be equal to zero before the date bonuses were introduced in 2003 (June 27th) and equal
to one thereafter. All variables are deﬁned as in (3) and the sample is selected according to the
same criteria.49 Reassuringly, Column 5 shows that the eﬀect of social connections during the
entire 2004 season is of similar magnitude to the eﬀect before the introduction of the bonus in
2003. In other words, in 2004 when managers are paid ﬁxed wages throughout the season, they
appear to allocate more eﬀort towards connected workers throughout the season.
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37All observations are at the worker-field-day level
Means, standard deviation between workers in parentheses, and standard deviation within worker in brackets
Fixed Wages Performance Bonus
Share of managers connected to i (Cift) .425 .412
(.297) (.300)
[.196] [.154]
Share of managers who are the same nationality as i .304 .285
Table 1: Descriptives on the Social Connectivity Between Workers and Managers, by Managerial 
Incentive Scheme (Worker-Field-Day Level)
Managerial Incentive Scheme
Share of managers who are the same nationality as i .304 .285
(.344) (.319)
[.145] [.111]
Share of managers who are in the same living area as i .139 .138
(.116) (.172)
[.167] [.138]
Share of managers who are from the same arrival cohort as i .038 .056
(.076) (.101)
[.079] [.074]
Notes: All variables are defined at the worker-field-day level. A manager and worker are defined to be resident in the same living area if they live within five caravans
from each other on the farm. A manager and worker are defined to be in the same arrival cohort if they have identification numbers within the same ten digit window.
A manager and given worker i are defined to be connected if they are either of the same nationality, live in the same area, or are in the same arrival cohort. The
sample is restricted to the 129 workers who work for at least one week under both incentive schemes and are connected to at least one manager on at least one
dimension. On average, each worker is observed picking on 41 field-days when managers are paid fixed wages, and 30 field-days when managers are paid a
performance bonus. Overall there are 5137 worker-field-day observations when managers are paid fixed wages, and 3747 worker-field-day observations when
managers are paid a performance bonus.All observations are at the worker-field-day level
Means, standard errors in parentheses
Managerial Incentive Scheme: Fixed Wages Performance Bonus Difference




   1.77*** .179    1.59***
(.352) (.750) (.609)
Managerial Incentive Scheme: Fixed Wages Performance Bonus Difference
6.10 6.60 .506
Table 2: Worker Productivity (kg/hr), by Social Connectivity to Managers and 
Managerial Incentive Scheme
Difference
 PANEL A: All Workers
Unconnected on field-day (DCift=0)
Connected on field-day (DCift=1)
PANEL B: Low Ability Workers 
6.10 6.60 .506
(.248) (.342) (.423)
7.37 6.77   -.603**
(.173) (.212) (.211)
   1.27*** .161   1.11**
(.287) (.368) (.435)
Managerial Incentive Scheme: Fixed Wages Performance Bonus Difference
7.76 10.79    3.03***
(.259) (.672) (.609)
10.32 11.61    1.28***
(.519) (.668) (.338)
   2.56*** .815   1.75**
(.518) (.899) (.719)
Connected on field-day (DCift=1)
Unconnected on field-day (DCift=0)
Connected on field-day (DCift=1)
Difference
Difference
PANEL C: High Ability Workers
Unconnected on field-day (DCift=0)
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. All variables are defined at the worker-field-day level. The
standard errors on the differences, and difference-in-difference, are estimated from running the corresponding least
squares regression, allowing the standard errors to be clustered by worker. Productivity is measured as the number of
kilograms of fruit picked per hour by the worker on the field-day. A manager and given worker i are defined to be
connected if they are either of the same nationality, live in the same area, or are in the same arrival cohort. A worker is
defined to be unconnected on the field-day if she is not socially connected to any of her managers that field-day. A worker
is defined to be connected on the field-day if she is socially connected to at least one of her managers. Low (high) ability
workers are those whose average productivity under the bonus is below (above) the median average productivity.Table 3: Social Connections and Managerial Incentives
Dependent Variable = Log of worker's productivity (kilograms picked per hour on the field-day)
Standard errors reported in parentheses, allowing for clustering at worker level (Columns 1 to 3), clustering at the field-date level in Column 4
(1) Any Managers 
Connected To
(2) Share of Managers 
Connected To
(3) Heterogeneous 




Any managers connected to i, fixed wages for managers (DCift)   .049**
     (.019)
Any managers connected to i, performance bonus for managers (DCift) .016
(.032)
Share of managers connected to i, fixed wages for managers (Cift)    .158***    .143***   .106**
     (.040) (.040) (.045)
Share of managers connected to i, performance bonus for managers (Cift) -.083 -.079 -.060
(.088) (.088) (.061) (.088) (.088) (.061)
Difference-in-difference estimate .033    .241***    .222**   .167**
(.034) (.095) (.096) (.075)
Interactions of nationality x performance bonus dummy Yes [.147] Yes [.042] No No
Interactions of living site x performance bonus dummy Yes [.000] Yes [.000] No No
Interactions of arrival cohort x performance bonus dummy Yes [.000] Yes [.000] No No
Interactions of worker fixed effect x performance bonus dummy No No Yes [.000] Yes [.000]
Field-date fixed effects No No No Yes
Adjusted R-squared .4355 .4361 .4479 .5817
Number of observations (worker-field-day) 8884 8884 8884 8884
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. In Columns 1 to 3 the standard errors allow for clustering at the worker level. In Column 4 standard errors are clustered at the field-date level. All specifications control for
worker, field, and manager fixed effects. The other controls included in specifications 1 to 3 include the managerial performance bonus dummy, the worker's picking experience, the field life cycle, a time trend, and interactions
between the performance bonus dummy and the worker's nationality, arrival cohort, and living site. The field life cycle is defined as the nth day the field is picked divided by the total number of days the field is picked over the season.
In Column 4 these interactions are replaced by interactions of the worker fixed effect and the performance bonus dummy, and a series of field-date fixed effects and hence the field life cycle and time trend are dropped from this
specification. All continuous variables are in logarithms. A manager and given worker i are defined to be connected if they are either of the same nationality, live in the same area, or are in the same arrival cohort. All sample workers
are connected to at least one manager on at least one field-day and work at least one week under each incentive scheme. In Column 1 a worker is defined to be unconnected on the field-day if she is not socially connected to any of
her managers that field-day, and the worker is defined to be connected on the field-day if she is socially connected to at least one of her managers. The difference-in-difference estimate is the difference in the effect of social
connections on worker productivity by managerial incentive scheme. At the foot of each column we report the p-value on the F-test on the joint significance the interaction terms with the performance bonus dummy.Table 4: Quantile Regression Estimates
Dependent Variable = Log of worker's productivity (kilograms picked per hour on the field-day)
Standard errors reported in parentheses
10th 25th  50th 75th 90th
Performance bonus for managers (αθ) -.093 .001   .100**    .214***    .312***
(.078) (.037) (.034) (.040) (.041)
Share of managers connected to i (β ) .013   .074**    .144***    .272***    .392***
Quantile of Worker Productivity
Share of managers connected to i (βθ) .013   .074**    .144***    .272***    .392***
(.067) (.032) (.030) (.036) (.037)
Performance bonus for managers x share of managers connected to i (γθ)   -.228**    -.175***    -.179***    -.168***    -.233***
  (.104) (.050) (.047) (.057) (.060)
Implied effect of performance bonus for managers on connected field-days (αθ+γθCift)   -.166**  -.055* .042    .160***    .237***
(evaluated at mean of Cift) (.069) (.033) (.031) (.035) (.035)
Number of observations (worker-field-day) 8884 8884 8884 8884 8884
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. All specifications control for field, and manager fixed effects. The other controls included in each specification
include the worker's picking experience, the field life cycle, and a time trend. The field life cycle is defined as the nth day the field is picked divided by the total number of days the field is picked over the season. All
continuous variables are in logarithms. A manager and given worker i are defined to be connected if they are either of the same nationality, live in the same area, or are in the same arrival cohort. The implied effect of the
bonus on connected days is computed assuming that the share of managers the worker is connected to is at the sample mean.Table 5: The Effect of Social Connections on Average Productivity
Dependent Variable = Log of average field-day productivity (kilograms picked per hour on the field-day)
Standard errors reported in parentheses, allowing for field specific AR(1)
(1) Unconditional  (2) Managers FE (3) Time Controls (4) Field FE
Average connections           , fixed wages for managers     -.779***   -.544**    -.675***   -.535**
     (.201) (.255) (.238) (.250)
Average connections           , performance bonus for managers  .206 .149 .122 .031
(.509) (.529) (.484) (.480)
Manager fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Time controls No No Yes Yes
Field fixed effects No No No Yes
Adjusted R-squared .944 .943 .948 .909
Number of observations (field-day) 241 241 241 241
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. AR(1) regression estimates are reported. Panel corrected standard errors are calculated using a Prais-Winsten regression, allowing the error
terms to be field specific heteroskedastic, and contemporaneously correlated across fields. The autocorrelation process is assumed to be specific to each field. Each field-day observation is weighted by the
log of the number of workers present. All specifications control for the bonus dummy that is equal to 1 when the managerial performance bonus scheme is in place, and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable
is the log of the average productivity at the field-day level. The average connection variable is computed as the average of the social connection measure for all workers on the field-day. A manager and given
worker i are defined to be connected if they are either of the same nationality, live in the same area, or are in the same arrival cohort. Time controls included in Columns 3 and 4 are a linear time trend and
the field life cycle, defined as the nth day the field is picked divided by the total number of days the field is picked over the season.
) ( ift C
) ( ift CFigure 1: Workers Fixed Effects, by Connection Status and Managerial Incentive Scheme


















































.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Field-days when 
worker i is 
connected
Field-days when 
worker i is 
connected
Field-days when 
worker i is 
not connected
Field-days when 
worker i is 
not connected
(c) Field-days when worker i  is connected to his manager (d) Field-days when worker i is not connected to his manager
1 1.5 2 2.5 3
x



















1 1.5 2 2.5 3
x
Notes:  Residual productivity is the worker fixed effect in the regression of log productivity on worker experience, field life cycle, trend, field fixed effects and manager fixed effects. For each 
worker we estimate a fixed effect in each of the four possible states: when managers are paid wages and the worker is connected, when managers are paid wages and the worker is not 
connected, when managers are paid bonuses and the worker is connected, and when managers are paid bonuses and the worker is not connected.
Residual Productivity (kg/hr)
Field-days when 
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Residual Productivity (kg/hr) Residual Productivity (kg/hr)
Field-days when 
managers are paid 
fixed wages
Field-days when 
managers are paid 
performance bonuses
Field-days when 
managers are paid 
performance bonusesTable A1: Social Connections, Managerial Incentives, and the COO's Allocation Algorithm
Conditional logit estimates
Column 1: Dependent Variable = 1 if worker i is chosen to pick on day t in main site, 0 if worker is assigned to non-picking tasks
Column 2: Dependent Variable = 1 if worker i is unemployed on day t, 0 if assigned to non-picking tasks
Odd ratios reported, standard errors in parentheses, clustered by worker
Performance bonus for managers 1.34  2.04*
(.495) (.764)
Performance bonus for managers x worker i is socially connected .524 .605
(.214) (.253)
Total yield in site 1    2.24***    .802***
Probability of Being 
Unemployed
Probability of Being 
Selected to Pick
Total yield in site 1    2.24***    .802***
(.153) (.057)
Total yield in site 2    .883***    .800***
(.036) (.032)
Number of workers available to pick fruit    .380***    1.83***
(.037) (.178)
Worker i's previous deviation from mean productivity  1.16* 1.07
(.091) (.107)
Log-likelihood -5186.8 -3208.5
Number of observations (worker-day) 15551 9808
Notes: *** denotes that the log odds ratio is significantly different from one at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% levels. Conditional logit estimates are reported where
observations are grouped by worker. All continuous variables are divided by their standard deviations so that one unit increase can be interpreted as increase by one
standard deviation. A manager and given worker i are defined to be connected if they are either of the same nationality, live in the same area, or are in the same
arrival cohort. "Total yield" on the site is the total kilograms of the fruit picked on the site-day. The "number of workers available to pick fruit" is the total number of
individuals that are on the farm that day and are available for fruit picking. "Worker i's previous deviation from mean productivity" is defined on the last day the worker
was selected to pick. We first take the deviation of the worker's productivity from the field average productivity on each field he picked on the day he was last selected
to pick, and then calculate a weighted average of this across all fields he worked on where the weights are based on the number of pickers on the field. Worker i is
defined to be unemployed on day t if she is present on the farm but is not assigned to any paid tasks.Table A2: Social Connections and Managerial Incentives
Dependent Variable = Log of worker's productivity (kilograms picked per hour on the field-day)
Standard errors reported in parentheses, allowing for clustering at worker level
Type of Social 
Connection
Share of managers of same nationality as i, fixed wages for managers    .162***
     (.045)
Share of managers of same nationality as i, performance bonus for managers -.075
(.134)
Share of managers living in same area as i, fixed wages for managers  .087*
     (.049)
Share of managers living in same area as i, performance bonus for managers -.070
(.071)
Share of managers of same arrival cohort as i, fixed wages for managers    .309***
(.088)
Share of managers of same arrival cohort as i, performance bonus for managers -.079
(.142)
Interactions of nationality x performance bonus dummy Yes [.068]
Interactions of living site x performance bonus dummy Yes [.000]
Interactions of arrival cohort x performance bonus dummy Yes [.000]
Interactions of worker fixed effect x performance bonus dummy No
Field-date fixed effects No
Adjusted R-squared .4366
Number of observations (worker-field-day) 8884
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Standard errors allow for clustering at the worker level. All specifications control for
worker, field, and manager fixed effects. The other controls include the managerial performance bonus dummy, the worker's picking experience,
the field life cycle, a time trend, and interactions between the performance bonus dummy and the worker's nationality, arrival cohort, and living site.
The field life cycle is defined as the nth day the field is picked divided by the total number of days the field is picked over the season. All continuous
variables are in logarithms. At the foot of the column we report the p-value on the F-test on the joint significance the interaction terms with the
performance bonus dummy.Table A3: Robustness of Results to Time Effects
Dependent Variable = Log of worker's productivity (kilograms picked per hour on the field-day)










(4) Placebo Bonus 
Based on Field 
Life Cycle
(5) Placebo 
Bonus Based on 
2004 Season
Share of managers connected to i, fixed wages for managers    .165***    .188***    .269***
     (.043) (.067) (.094)
Share of managers connected to i, performance bonus for managers -.037 -.003 .345
(.092) (.116) (.511)
Share of managers connected to i, fixed wages for managers x 2nd quarter dummy (31st May) -.018
(.076)
Share of managers connected to i, performance bonus for managers x 4th quarter dummy (29th July) -.133
(.099)
Share of managers connected to i, fixed wages for managers x field life cycle -.089
(.141)
Share of managers connected to i, performance bonus for managers x field life cycle -.249
(.200) (.200)
Share of managers connected to i, fixed wages for managers x days on farm for worker i -.047
(.035)
Share of managers connected to i, performance bonus for managers x days on farm for worker i -.109
(.132)
Share of managers connected to i, placebo bonus based on field life cycle = 0 -.087
(.081)
Share of managers connected to i, placebo bonus based on field life cycle = 1 -.033
(.138)
Share of managers connected to i, placebo bonus 2004 = 0  .201*
(.109)
Share of managers connected to i, placebo bonus 2004 = 1    .215***
(.033)
Interactions of nationality x performance bonus dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interactions of living site x performance bonus dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interactions of arrival cohort x performance bonus dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared .4374 .4524 .4368 .6260 .4532
Number of observations (worker-field-day) 8884 8884 8884 1584 2692
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Standard errors allow for clustering at the worker level. All specifications control for worker, field, and manager fixed effects. The other controls included in each specification include the managerial
performance bonus dummy, the worker's picking experience, the field life cycle, and a time trend. The field life cycle is defined as the nth day the field is picked divided by the total number of days the field is picked over the season. All continuous variables are in
logarithms. A manager and given worker i are defined to be connected if they are either of the same nationality, live in the same area, or are in the same arrival cohort. All sample workers are connected to at least one manager on at least one field-day and work at
least one week under each incentive scheme. In Column 1 the 2nd quarter dummy is defined to be equal to zero before May 31st and one thereafter. The 4th quarter dummy is defined to be equal to zero before July 29th and one thereafter. These dummy variables
split the pre and post bonus periods equally into two halves. In Column 3 the days on the farm for a worker are defined as the number of days elapsed since the worker first arrived on the farm. In Column 4 the placebo bonus dummy based on the field life cycle is
defined to be zero if the field is less than .53 of the way though its life cycle, and one otherwise. In this column the sample is restricted to fields that are only operated in the period when managers are paid a performance bonus (after June 27th). In Column 5, the
sample covers the same period of time (May 1st to Aug 31st) in the following year --2004-- when managers were paid wages throughout. The placebo bonus is equal to 1 after June 27, 2004. The interaction terms at the foot of the table are defined with respect to the
placebo bonus dummy variable in Columns 4 and 5.